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ALIEN TORT STATUTE ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY CASES: SHOULD COURTS APPLY
THE PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING STANDARD OF
BELL A TLANTIC v. TWOMBL Y?
Amanda Sue Nichols*
When a corporation operating abroad either conspires with, or aids and
abets, an oppressive regime in violating human rights, victims can seek
redress in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statute. In assessing such
claims, some courts have chosen to apply a liberal pleading standard, while
others have applied a heightened pleading standard to combat frivolous
lawsuits. This Note suggests that courts should apply a third standard-the
plausibility standard applied to claims under section 1 of the Sherman Act
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. This Note
argues that applying that standard to Alien Tort Statute accomplice liability
claims best addresses procedural and practical concerns of both the
government and defendants, while ensuring that the judicial system
continues to afford plaintiffs the ability to seek justice.
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2007, in the case of Romero v. Drummond Co., an Alabama
jury became the first to issue a verdict in a case brought against a
corporation under the Alien Tort Statute' (ATS) for aiding and abetting a
state actor in violating human rights.2 Since the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held in Kadic v. Karadi that individuals could bring
claims under the ATS against private actors acting together with state
actors,3 plaintiffs have brought a significant number of cases alleging that a
corporation either conspired with or aided and abetted a government actor
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to Professor Marc
Arkin for her invaluable guidance, my family for their support, and Patrick for his patience.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Although enacted in 1789, plaintiffs rarely brought cases
under the statute until it resurfaced in 1980. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
Historically, the statute was referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA); however, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004), held that the
statute is jurisdictional and does not create a cause of action. Thus, the statute is now
frequently referred to as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Quotes referring to the statute as the
ATCA remain unchanged.
2. See infra Part I.A.2.c for a discussion of Romero v. Drummond Co., the first, and
thus far only, ATS accomplice liability case to reach the trial stage.
3. Kadic v. Karadi6, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
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in perpetrating human rights abuses. 4 Thus, although Drummond resulted
in an acquittal, it sent a strong message that plaintiffs were going to hold
not only state actors but anyone else who may have been complicit in their
actions accountable for human rights abuses.5 For some, the fact that a case
like Drummond reached the trial stage at all is objectionable; they fear that
factually weak complaints may be upheld, leading to excessive, costly, and
time-consuming litigation,6 not to mention potential harm to foreign policy
objectives and corporate reputations. 7  This Note advocates that one
possible way to address these concerns is through the pleading standard
applied to ATS accomplice liability claims-an issue on which courts
remain divided.
Some courts have adhered to the traditional notice pleading requirement
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), letting claims continue that are
ultimately dismissed through summary judgment or result in a settlement. 8
Others have opted to combat the perceived harms of ATS accomplice
liability litigation by applying a de facto heightened pleading standard,
essentially requiring plaintiffs to prove elements of their claim at the initial
stage of a case as opposed to during summary judgment or trial. 9 The
pleading standard applied is significant because, while there is "[the] risk
that too high a pleading standard will prevent the discovery necessary to
4. See In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ("Within
the last decade, a significant number of cases have been filed that allege that major United
States corporate entities are vicariously liable for human rights abuses abroad under the
ATCA .. "). The proliferation of ATS accomplice liability cases is a direct effect of
globalization, which has led to greater corporate investment in developing countries and, as a
result, has increased awareness of the human rights abuses some of those countries
perpetrate. See Terry Collingsworth, Beyond Public Relations: Bringing the Rule of Law to
Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy, 6 Corp. Governance 250, 250 (2006)
(noting that part of what attracts these corporations is the cost-saving opportunities presented
by operating in a country with a government "willing to inflict economic and human rights
abuses on its own people"). Furthermore, given the practical difficulties of reaching
governmental actors, plaintiffs increasingly only sue the corporations for their role in the
perpetration of human rights violations. See Frank Christian Olah, MNC Liability for
International Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Review &
Analysis of the Fundamental Jurisprudence and a Look at Aiding & Abetting Liability Under
the Act, 25 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 751, 752-53 (2007) ("[C]ertain defenses available to ATCA
defendants (e.g., personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, the act of state doctrine, the
doctrine of international comity, the political question doctrine, foreign sovereign immunity,
and head-of-state immunity) often result in the foreign government party being dismissed
from the case leaving the [corporation] as the only available defendant." (citations omitted)).
5. Given the conflation of conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims in ATS cases, for
the purposes of this Note the term "accomplice liability" will refer to claims that a
corporation either aided and abetted or conspired with a state actor in violating the law of
nations.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 895 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
9. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh-Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247-50 (1 1th
Cir. 2005); Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
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unearth involvement in the misdeeds that Congress hoped to remedy
through the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims Act]," conversely, "there is also a
risk that vague, conclusory, and attenuated allegations will allow
individuals ... to engage in unwarranted international 'fishing expeditions'
against corporate entities and to abuse the judicial process in order to
pursue political agendas."' 10 The application of varying pleading standards
in ATS cases has demonstrated the problems that can arise at either
extreme: the low bar of the notice pleading standard risks causing
settlement pressure and allowing frivolous and excessive litigation, whereas
the high bar of the heightened pleading standard risks preventing legitimate
claims from going forward. Moreover, the variability of the pleading
standard, and the inconsistent outcomes that can result, combine to create
unpredictability.
Underscoring the existing confusion, one district court has explicitly
asked higher courts to clarify this issue. After applying a heightened
pleading standard in In re Sinaltrainal Litigation, Judge Jose E. Martinez of
the Southern District of Florida concluded his opinion by requesting that the
appellate court clarify the proper pleading standard for ATS accomplice
liability claims, stating,
In light of the growing number of ATCA lawsuits involving corporate
defendants, issues of what level of pleading is necessary in the ATCA
context, of how to determine vicarious liability, [and] of the extent to
which state action may be imputed to private actors ... are becoming
increasingly urgent. II
One possible resolution to the problem identified by Judge Martinez-that
can strike the balance the courts desire to achieve-is applying the
plausibility reading of Rule 8(a) as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 12
Twombly was a class action lawsuit brought by a group of plaintiffs
alleging that four incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain trade that resulted in
"inflate[ed] charges for local telephone and high-speed Internet services. '13
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint
for failure to state a claim, and the Supreme Court "granted certiorari to
address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct."' 14 The Supreme Court held that to state a
claim for relief adequately under section 1, plaintiffs must plead sufficient
additional facts beyond parallel conduct to render a conspiratorial
agreement plausible-facts typically required after the completion of
discovery. This decision reversed the Supreme Court's canonical reading
of Rule 8(a) that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
10. Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
11. Id. at 1302.
12. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965-66 (2007); see infra Part I.B.3.
13. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
14. Id. at 1963.
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claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."15
Since Twombly, the circuit courts have expressed confusion as to whether
the plausibility reading applies to all claims, only antitrust claims, or any
claim with elements and discovery burdens similar to antitrust cases. 16
Indeed, in his dissent in Twombly, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote,
"Whether the Court's actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust
treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a complaint
will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the future
will answer." 17  This Note, by analyzing the implications of all three
pleading standards in ATS accomplice liability cases, explores Justice
Stevens's question and suggests that, at the very least, the plausibility
standard should also apply to ATS accomplice liability claims. Like
antitrust cases, such claims have been interpreted to require a showing of
conspiratorial agreement in order to state a claim and have similar
procedural concerns. In addition to discussing the similarities between
antitrust and ATS accomplice liability cases, this Note also explores
whether the plausibility standard can address the concerns of the
government and corporate defendants regarding the procedural and practical
repercussions of ATS accomplice liability cases, while ensuring that
plaintiffs are still afforded a fair opportunity to seek redress for human
rights violations.
In doing so, this Note examines several key aspects of the ATS and its
policy rationales, as well as the recent decision in Twombly. Part I of this
Note addresses the background of the ATS as a jurisdictional statute and the
basis for bringing accomplice liability claims under it. Additionally, Part I
addresses the notice and heightened pleading standards as well as Twombly,
in which the Supreme Court endorsed a plausibility standard for antitrust
conspiracy claims. Part II discusses the rationale for the application of each
standard to ATS accomplice liability cases, and procedural and policy
considerations for determining the appropriate standard. Part III concludes
by relying on the analysis in Parts I and II in finding that the plausibility
standard articulated in Twombly is the proper standard to apply to ATS
accomplice liability cases against corporations.
I. FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE: THE ATS AND PLEADING STANDARDS
Cases brought under the ATS are unique among those heard in American
courts. Diversity is not required, international law governs, and federal
courts only have subject matter jurisdiction if the plaintiff can properly
show that the alleged offense is part of the law of nations. Part L.A
discusses the background of the ATS in U.S. courts and the requirements
for properly bringing a claim to establish jurisdiction. It also specifically
15. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
16. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
17. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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addresses the origins of accomplice liability claims under the ATS, the
elements of pleading conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims, and the
facts of Romero v. Drummond Co., the first ATS accomplice liability case
to reach the trial stage.
Establishing subject matter jurisdiction is only the first hurdle faced by
plaintiffs in ATS cases; this Note predominantly focuses on the second:
pleading a claim sufficient to withstand a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The current lack of a uniform pleading
standard has led to unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes. Part I.B
addresses notice pleading, heightened pleading, and plausibility pleading.
A. The ATS
1. The Revitalization of the ATS
Originally codified as section 9 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the statute
commonly referred to as the ATCA or ATS states that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."' 18 When ascertaining the content of the law of nations, a court must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today, as long as it is pled with the
same particularity as those claims recognized in 1789.19
In the approximately 200 years following its enactment, only one case
was successfully brought under the ATS. 20 The statute resurfaced in 1980
when the Second Circuit decided the seminal case of Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, which reaffirmed that federal courts had jurisdiction over claims
brought under the ATS that were (1) by an alien, (2) for a tort, and (3)
committed in violation of the law of nations.21 In Filartiga, the plaintiffs,
citizens of the Republic of Paraguay, alleged that Americo Norberto Pena-
Irala, in his capacity as inspector general of police in Asunci6n, Paraguay,
tortured and killed their family member, Joelito Filartiga, in retaliation for
his father's political activities and beliefs. 22 The Second Circuit held that
the torture was a violation of the law of nations, and therefore conferred
subject matter jurisdiction on the court under the ATS. 23 The court stressed
that torture was a particularly "well-established, universally recognized
norm[] of international law," and that there remains the requirement that
courts, in deciding whether the ATS confers jurisdiction, "engag[e] in a
more searching preliminary review of the merits than is required ... under
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
19. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004). See infra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa.
20. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
21. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 878.
23. Id. at 887, 890.
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the more flexible 'arising under' formulation." 24 Although the Filartiga
court did not elaborate as to why a "more searching preliminary review" is
required, it set the stage for the application of a higher standard of review to
claims brought under the ATS.
The next development in ATS litigation, also in the Second Circuit, was
Kadic. This case addressed whether plaintiffs, Croat and Muslim citizens
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, could bring a claim against Radovan Karadi,
president of the self-proclaimed republic of Srpska, for his role in the
human rights abuses perpetrated against them by Bosnian-Serb military
forces. 25 The Second Circuit held that a private actor operating under color
of law-meaning "act[ing] together with state officials or with significant
state aid"-in violation of the law of nations, could be held accountable
under the ATS. 26 Acknowledging that, by allowing suits against private
actors it was opening the door to more ATS cases, the Second Circuit in
Kadic emphasized that there was still a high bar for showing that an act
violates a customary law of nations by stating that "it is not a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction to plead merely a colorable violation of the law of
nations." 27  Although this formulation related to the requirements for
satisfying subject matter jurisdiction,28 it would later be relied upon by
courts in 12(b)(6) motions to justify applying a heightened standard for
pleading accomplice liability claims. 29
The decisions in Filartiga and Kadic created uncertainty as to the exact
nature of the ATS and what constituted the law of nations. In 2004, the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify these issues in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, defining the ATS as a purely jurisdictional statute and holding
that common law provides a cause of action under the ATS as long as it is
"defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms." 30  On the issue of defining the law of nations, the Court
24. Id. at 887-88.
25. Kadic v. Karad~id, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995).
26. Id. at 245.
27. Id. at 238.
28. On August 10, 2000, a New York jury found Radovan Karadi6 guilty of
committing genocide and awarded the Kadic plaintiffs a $745 million judgment and
injunction against Karad~i6. Maria T. Vullo, Prosecuting Genocide, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 495,
500-01 (2001).
29. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
30. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); see also Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 285 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring) (stating that the
Supreme Court decided Sosa "in an attempt to clarify the problems posed by the ATCA").
The eighteenth-century paradigms referred to by the Court in Sosa were the "violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
Although the Court did not provide an explanation as to the exact level of specificity
required, it did conclude that unlawful detention of an individual for one day did not meet
the standard. Id. at 738 ("It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates
no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal
remedy."). Furthermore, Justice Stephen Breyer in his concurring opinion provided
examples of possible violations of international law that would be actionable under the ATS,
such as "torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes." ld. at 762.
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stressed the "collateral consequences" and "potential implications for the
foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes," and thus
the need for "a high bar to new private causes of action for violating
international law." 3' The Court did not specify whether this "high bar"
involved pleading the violation or referred to the type of act necessary to
establish subject matter jurisdiction.
As a result of the Court's decision in Sosa, the Second Circuit, in a
subsequent case, found that "a federal court faced with a suit alleging a tort
in violation of international law must undertake two distinct analytical
inquiries." 32 The first step in the analysis is to determine that the court has
jurisdiction, which the court can accomplish by establishing that the offense
is a violation of a law of nations under the sources of international law
recognized by the Statute of the International Court of Justice.33 Once the
court establishes jurisdiction, the second line of inquiry is to determine
"whether a common-law cause of action should be created to provide a
remedy for the alleged violation of international law." 34 Only after a court
concludes it has jurisdiction and that the alleged offense is one that can be
heard under the ATS may the court look at the sufficiency of the pleading
to determine whether it states a claim for relief.
2. Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting Claims
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of
Accomplice Liability Claims Under the ATS
In order for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction over an ATS
accomplice liability case, the court must first find that the plaintiff alleged
that the private actor assisted in a crime that is a violation of the law of
nations.35 After determining that the underlying crime is a law of nations
violation, the court then decides whether there is a cause of action under the
statute for the type of accomplice liability alleged. Thus far, courts have
recognized two forms of accomplice liability actionable under the ATS:
"liability as a conspirator and liability for aiding and abetting." 36
31. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
32. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 266.
33. id. at 267. The identified sources of law include:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and]
d. . . .judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations ....
Id. (citing the Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187).
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 30, 33 and accompanying text.
36. See Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1359, 1383 (2002). Although most courts have
found accomplice liability to be actionable under the ATS, courts and commentators are still
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Prior to Sosa, the most notable application of accomplice liability to
corporations in the ATS context was in Doe I v. Unocal Corp.37 Relying on
the Second Circuit's color of law analysis in Kadic,38 the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California determined that a corporation
could be treated as a private actor under the ATS, providing the court with
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 39 Although the case eventually
settled, Unocal set the stage for plaintiffs to bring future claims against
corporations, either for being active participants in, or knowingly acting in
support of, a foreign sovereign's violation of the law of nations. Despite
the uncertainty created by the Unocal decision regarding the liability of
corporations, the Supreme Court in Sosa did not directly address the issue
because it was not a relevant question in the case. 40
One of the first post-Sosa cases to examine and reaffirm corporate
accomplice liability was Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc.41 In Presbyterian Church, the plaintiffs, non-Muslim Africans from
southern Sudan, sought to hold Talisman Energy, Inc., a Canadian
corporation, liable for having "conspired with or aided [The Republic of
Sudan] in committing three crimes recognized under international law:
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes." 42 Relying on Sosa,
Talisman moved to dismiss, claiming that "corporate liability and
secondary liability are not sufficiently definite and accepted in international
law to support an ATS claim."43 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York disagreed with defendant Talisman's interpretation of
Sosa and held that "customary international law provides for secondary
debating the type of crimes for which plaintiffs can hold private actors liable. For a
discussion of the post-Sosa circuit split regarding whether or when corporate liability
provides jurisdiction under the ATS, see generally Tim Kline, Note, A Door Ajar or a
Floodgate?: Corporate Liability After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 94 Ky. L.J. 691 (2006).
37. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th
Cir. 2002). For a more detailed discussion of Unocal, see infra notes 152-59.
38. Kadic v. Karad~id, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
39. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91.
40. In fact, the only mention of corporate liability in Sosa is a footnote where the Court
states, "A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporation or individual." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20
(2004); see also Olah, supra note 4, at 770-71 (noting the Court's omission in addressing
corporate liability, and claiming that "the [Sosa] Court appeared in the footnote to implicitly
affirm the cognoscibility of ATCA claims against [corporate] defendants").
41. 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing defendants' motion for judgment
on the pleadings).
42. Presbyterian Church v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638-39
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting defendants' summary judgment motion). Regarding conspiracy,
the complaint alleged
that Talisman conspired with the Government to carry out a campaign of ethnic
cleansing, including extrajudicial killing, war crimes, forcible displacement,
military bombings and assaults on civilian targets, confiscation and destruction of
property, kidnapping, rape, and enslavement against the non-Muslim, African
Sudanese population living in and near the oil concession areas.
Id. at 662.
43. Presbyterian Church, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
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liability."'44 After five years of discovery and motion practice, the court
ultimately granted Talisman's motion for summary judgment and precluded
the plaintiffs from filing another amended complaint.45  The court
dismissed the conspiracy claims on the ground that under international law
"the offense of conspiracy is limited to conspiracies to commit genocide
and to wage aggressive war," neither of which were alleged in the
complaint.46 Not all courts, however, have recognized this limitation on
conspiracy claims. For example, one year earlier the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, relying on domestic law, extended the reach of
corporate conspiracy liability to a number of violations of international law,
including crimes against humanity. 4 7 Thus, although some courts disagree
as to which law of nations violations are actionable, most have accepted
that "international law provides for the imposition of liability on a party that
does not directly perform the underlying act.''48
b. Pleading Third Party Liability Under the A TS
Once the court has determined that the threshold of subject matter
jurisdiction has been established, and that there is a cause of action for the
particular law of nations violation under the ATS, the next hurdle the
plaintiffs face is pleading the elements of their claim. 49 There are no
uniform criteria for pleading ATS conspiracy or aiding and abetting claims,
44. Id. at 337-38. For a further discussion of the sources of international law supporting
aider and abettor liability, see Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277
(2d Cir. 2007) (analyzing international law's treatment of aider and abettor liability and
finding that is was "sufficiently 'well-established [and] universally recognized' to be
considered customary international law for the purposes of the [ATS]" (quoting Kadic v.
Karad~id, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995))); Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of
Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances
Constructive Engagement, 21 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. (forthcoming Summer 2008) (manuscript at
1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1004765.
45. Presbyterian Church, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 679, 689.
46. Id. at 663.
47. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (11 th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (relying on the criteria established in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481, 487
(D.C. Cir. 1983), to prove that an individual was part of a burglary conspiracy, and outlining
the requirements for proving a conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, mistreatment,
torture, or extrajudicial killing under the ATS). Although not the subject of this Note, courts
are unclear "'as to what body of law applies to ancillary issues that may arise, such as
whether a third party may be held liable in tort' for a violation of international norms."
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 287 (Hall, J., concurring) (quoting Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)). As Judge Peter W. Hall noted in his
concurring opinion in Khulumani, "Sosa at best lends Delphian guidance on the question of
whether the federal common law or customary international law represents the proper source
from which to derive a standard of [third party] liability under the ATCA." Khulumani, 504
F.3d at 286.
48. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 285-86 & n.33 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (collecting cases).
49. Some courts, such as in Sinaltrainal, also require that the complaint sufficiently
plead a claim in order to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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but there are common elements. For example, one shared element is the
requirement that the corporation have knowledge that its actions amounted
to complicity in human rights abuses, meaning that it had either a tacit or an
express agreement with a state actor to perpetrate those abuses.
In assessing whether a complaint adequately states a claim of complicity,
most courts rely on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
statement in Doe I v. Unocal Corp. regarding the key mens rea element of
aider and abettor liability: that a plaintiff must show the defendant rendered
"knowing practical assistance, or encouragement, which has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime." 50  Specifically, in Unocal, the
Ninth Circuit held that international precedent requires that a corporation
have either actual or constructive knowledge that its actions would
substantially assist in the commission of a law of nations violation. 51
Significantly, the knowledge requirement ensures that there is at least a
tacit, if not an explicit, agreement. Relying on Unocal, the Southern
District of New York later outlined a more detailed standard in
Presbyterian Church, stating,
To show that a defendant aided and abetted a violation of international
law, an ATS plaintiff must show:
1) that the principal violated international law;
2) that the defendant knew of the specific violation;
3) that the defendant acted with the intent to assist that violation,
that is, the defendant specifically directed his acts to assist in the
specific violation;
4) that the defendant's acts had a substantial effect upon the success
of the criminal venture; and
5) that the defendant was aware that the acts assisted the specific
violation. 52
Although aiding and abetting claims do not require an explicit agreement,
the Presbyterian Church articulation of the elements of an ATS aiding and
abetting claim suggests that a plaintiff must show a tacit agreement,
whereby the corporate defendant implicitly agrees to act as an accomplice
to a state actor by having knowledge of, and affirmatively assisting, that
state actor's violation of the law of nations.
The most common criteria courts use for analyzing the sufficiency of an
ATS conspiracy claim is the joint action test. "Traditionally, either a
conspiracy or 'willful participation' with the state actor will satisfy the
50. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 951 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), reh "g en bane, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
51. Id. at 950-5 1; see also Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decisions for Issues
Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 479-80 (2007).
52. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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'joint action test.' 53 The joint action test "address[es] situations in which a
private individual, acting in concert with the government, commits the
challenged acts." 54  In the context of ATS conspiracy claims, the joint
action test looks to "whether state officials and private parties acted in
concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights. '55 As
one commentator has noted regarding ATS conspiracy claims, "Knowledge
and intent are crucial to the imposition of liability on the basis of joint
action" in order to ensure that a corporation is not held liable in cases where
it is "unaware that its actions or those of its sovereign host are violating the
human rights of others."'56 Thus, regardless of whether the claim against a
corporation is one of aiding and abetting or one of conspiracy, plaintiffs
must plead facts sufficient to show that the corporation had an agreement,
tacit or explicit, with a state actor to undertake acts that furthered a law of
nations violation.
c. ATS Accomplice Liability on Trial: Romero v. Drummond Co.
On July 26, 2007, an Alabama jury reached a verdict in the first case
alleging accomplice liability against a corporation under the ATS to reach
the trial stage, Romero v. Drummond Co. As the attorneys for both sides
agree, the outcome of this case and the issues pending on appeal may have a
substantial effect on future ATS accomplice liability cases. 57
On March 14, 2002, plaintiffs, the Sintramienergetica trade union and
relatives of Valmore Locarno Rodriquez, Victor Hugo Orcasita Amaya, and
Gustavo Soler Mora, brought suit under the ATS against Drummond Co.,
Drummond Ltd., and Gary N. Drummond, alleging that the defendants were
liable for the use of the Colombian paramilitaries as their agents in bringing
about the wrongful deaths of Locamo, Orcasita, and Soler, all leaders of the
union. 58 Initially the plaintiffs only asserted claims of extrajudicial killing
and "denial of fundamental rights to associate and organize," choosing to
plead their aiding and abetting claims under Alabama law. 59 The complaint
was eventually joined with four related actions, and after five years of
discovery and summary judgment motions, the defendants were reduced to
53. Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1304 (S.D. Fla.
2003), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 416 F.3d 1242 (11 th Cir. 2006). The joint action test is
one of four tests used to determine whether private conduct constitutes state action. Id. The
other three tests are (1) the nexus test, (2) the symbiotic relationship test, and (3) the public
function test. Id.
54. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1307 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
55. Id. at 1305 (citation omitted).
56. Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide
Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 119, 134 (2007).
57. Jay Reeves, Labor Loses Landmark Case: Both Sides Say Appeals Rulings Likely
Will Set the Precedent for U.S. Companies Abroad, Hous. Chron., July 28, 2007, at A 16.
58. Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253-54 (N.D. Ala.
2003).
59. Id. at 1255-56.
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Drummond Ltd. and the head of its Colombian operations, Augusto
Jimenez.60 Additionally, the aiding and abetting claim was brought under
the ATS, as opposed to Alabama law, and the issues were narrowed such
that at trial the judge instructed the jury that, to prevail, "the families and
union must prove Drummond knowingly aided the killers and committed
what amounts to a war crime in Colombia." 61
In its summary judgment order, the district court dismissed the torture
claims under the ATS, Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and
Alabama common law; the extrajudicial killing claim under the TVPA; and
all claims against Drummond Co. 62 The court denied summary judgment
as to the aiding and abetting claims, holding that "Plaintiffs have put
forward sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
Defendants' liability for violation of the Alien Tort Claims Act, under a
theory of aiding and abetting liability. '63 The court left open whether the
plaintiffs could bring conspiracy claims contingent on whether it decided to
admit certain deposition testimony-although ultimately it was not
permitted. 64
Thus, at trial, in order to hold defendants liable for the deaths of the three
union leaders' plaintiffs had to show
1. First, that defendants substantially assisted some person or persons
who personally committed or caused one or more of the murders; and
2. Second, that at the time the assistance was provided, defendants knew
that their actions would assist in the murders. 65
After two weeks of trial, the jury "rejected plaintiffs' claims, finding that
there was insufficient evidence to hold the defendant ... liable for aiding
and betting [sic] the alleged assassination and torture of union leaders by
paramilitary groups."'66 The decision led to what some call "a defeat for
labor in a test of whether companies can be held responsible in U.S.
courtrooms for their conduct overseas." 67  Drummond attorney Robert
Mittelstaedt noted that the acquittal will send a message to potential
60. Defendant's Trial Brief at 1-2, Romero v. Drummond Co., No. CV-03-BE-0575-W
(N.D. Ala. June 15, 2007).
61. Jay Reeves, Drummond Coal Killings: Trial for Deaths of Colombian Labor
Leaders Goes to Jurors, Press-Register (Mobile, Ala.), July 26, 2007, at B2.
62. See Order, Drummond, No. CV-03-BE-0575-W (Mar. 5, 2007).
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 4 n.4.
65. Pretrial Order at 5, Drummond, No. CV-03-BE-0575-W (June 20, 2007); see also
Defendant's Trial Brief, supra note 60, at 3 (stating that the plaintiffs had to prove "not only
that defendants substantially assisted the paramilitaries but also that defendants knew and
intended that the paramilitaries would assassinate [the three leaders]" and that they did so "in
order to further some political or military goal of the paramilitaries" (emphasis omitted)).
66. Faith E. Gay & J. Noah Hagey, Outside Counsel: Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Claims Tort Claims Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 24, 2007, at 4; see also Jury Verdict Form,
Drummond, No. CV-03-BE-0575-W (July 26, 2007).
67. Jay Reeves, Drummond Cleared in Colombia Killings, Press-Register (Mobile,
Ala.), July 27, 2007, at 2B.
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plaintiffs that "it's not enough to make wild, unsubstantiated allegations and
hope juries will be swayed. '68 The plaintiffs' claims, however, survived
both a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment,
calling into question the notion that the claims were "frivolous."
Indeed, as of the writing of this Note, the appeal of the jury verdict is
pending in the Eleventh Circuit, with plaintiffs "contesting the trial court's
refusal to allow out-of-court, nondeposition testimony of former
paramilitary members into the record."'69 The district court judge prohibited
"the testimony of three men the union said had firsthand knowledge of
Drummond's links with antiunion gunmen allied with the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia," for various procedural reasons. 70 If the
Eleventh Circuit finds that the district court improperly excluded deposition
testimony, it is possible that it will order a new trial on the conspiracy
claims. 71
B. Pleading Standards
The first step in bringing a lawsuit is filing a complaint stating the
allegations against the party or parties from whom the plaintiff(s) seeks
relief. Except for cases pleading fraud or mistake,72 the allegations in
complaints are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which
states that a complaint must contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction,
unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the
relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types
of relief.73
If a complaint fails to meet this standard on its face, the defendant can
move to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim. 74 If the court finds that the complaint fails to
state a claim, it can either dismiss the action, or grant the plaintiff(s) leave
68. Reeves, supra note 57 (citation omitted).
69. Gay & Hagey, supra note 66, at 9.
70. Russell Hubbard, Colombia Case Appealed; Company Sued over Three Slayings,
Birmingham News, Dec. 15, 2007, at IC.
71. Id.
72. Pleading allegations of fraud or mistake are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), which states that, "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
74. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states,
Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following
defenses by motion: . . . failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ....
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to amend the complaint. A 12(b)(6) motion is typically brought prior to the
discovery stage of the litigation. 75
The following sections discuss the three approaches taken by courts in
the level of specificity required in pleading a claim to survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Part I.B.1 discusses notice pleading, the most liberal
interpretation of Rule 8(a). Part I.B.2 addresses the de facto heightened
pleading standard applied by courts to specific types of claims. The
unofficial nature of the heightened pleading standard-it has been explicitly
repudiated by the Supreme Court-means that its application to particular
claims varies by case; there is also uncertainty surrounding whether all or
some of the elements of the claim require a more specific level of pleading
than the liberal requirements of notice pleading. The final standard,
discussed in Part I.B.3, is the Supreme Court's recently adopted plausibility
standard, which requires enough facts supporting a claim to render it
conceivable. Depending on the case, it can require more specificity than the
notice pleading standard, but less than the courts have required when
applying a heightened pleading standard.
1. Notice Pleading
One of the primary functions of a complaint is to put the defendant on
notice of the claims being asserted against him.76 At common law,
pleadings served the concurrent functions of "(1) providing notice of a
claim or defense, (2) stating facts, (3) narrowing issues to be litigated, and
(4) allowing for quick disposition of sham claims and defenses. '77 The
committee drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-led by Yale Law
School Dean Charles Clark-sought to codify a more "simple, uniform, and
transsubstantive" concept of pleading, and thus enacted Rule 8, requiring
that pleadings serve the single role of notice as opposed to "the multiple
functions of notice, fact development, winnowing, and early disposition. '78
The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure
codified these additional procedural functions in other rules such as those
governing discovery and summary judgment.79
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the primary notice function of
Rule 8(a) in the 1947 case Hickman v. Taylor, when it observed that the
75. There are instances where discovery may have begun prior to the 12(b)(6) motion.
One such instance is a motion to dismiss a complaint that has been amended since discovery
began. Although the immense burdens of discovery are relevant to the issue addressed in
this Note, the actual details of discovery are not. For further discussion of the Federal Rules
surrounding discovery, see Richard L. Marcus et al., Civil Procedure: A Modem Approach
342-54 (4th ed. 2005), and Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 Ariz.
L. Rev. 987, 992-94 (2003).
76. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202
(3d ed. 2004).
77. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 551, 556 (2002).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 556-57.
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Federal Rules "restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving." 80
Ten years later the Supreme Court reinforced the notice pleading standard
in Conley v. Gibson.8 1 In Conley, the Court stated that "a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."'82 Thus, in order to satisfy the notice pleading
standard of Rule 8(a) all that is required is "a short and plain statement of
the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 83 The rationale both of the
framers of Rule 8 and the Supreme Court in its construction of the Rule
intended to preserve the litigant's ability to get his day in court, and to
uphold the principle that "the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits." 84  The term "notice pleading" is misleading,
however, insofar as a plaintiff cannot simply state a "bare averment that he
wants relief and is entitled to it."'85 In reality, notice pleading still requires
an appropriate number of facts supporting the allegation, such that there is
adequate information regarding the claim for relief for the defendant to
answer.86 This specificity varies because "[w]hat constitutes a short and
plain statement must be determined in each case on the basis of the nature
of the action, the relief sought, and the perspective positions of the parties




The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a heightened
pleading requirement outside of Rule 9, and the Supreme Court has
explicitly and repeatedly rejected grafting such a requirement onto Rule 8.88
This, however, has not stopped lower courts from attempting to raise the
pleading bar in certain classes of claims, including those brought under the
80. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S 495, 501 (1947).
81. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
82. 1d. at 45-46.
83. Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wright & Miller, supra note
76, at 89-90 ("[P]leadings under the rules simply may be a general summary of the party's
position that is sufficient to advise the other party of the event being sued upon, to provide
some guidance in a subsequent proceeding as to what was decided for purposes of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, and to indicate whether the case should be tried to the court
or to a jury. No more is demanded of the pleadings than this .....
84. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
85. Wright & Miller, supra note 76, at 94-95.
86. Id.
87. Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading
Practice 610 (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-36, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012971 (quoting Wright & Miller, supra note 76, § 1216, at 240-
41).
88. See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
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ATS.8 9 As a result of this continued application of a heightened pleading
standard, Professor Christopher Fairman claims that notice pleading has
become something of a "myth" insofar as, "[s]ometimes subtle, other times
overt, federal courts in every circuit impose non-Rule-based heightened
pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading doctrine," 90 leading
"courts [to] require certain elements of a claim or subsets of a broader
category of a claim to be pleaded with greater factual detail." 9 1
Courts initially experimented with a heightened pleading standard in
cases involving violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.92 The use of a heightened
pleading standard originated as a "tool to deal with the uncertainties
surrounding the substantive law of qualified immunity" in order to protect
government defendants from frivolous lawsuits. 9 3 In response, the Supreme
Court rejected the use of a heightened pleading standard based on Rule 8(a)
in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit.94 Leatherman involved two separate incidents of police misconduct
for which the plaintiffs sued, among other defendants, the municipal
corporations that employed the police officers. 95  The defendants
maintained that the "degree of factual specificity required of a complaint by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure varies according to the complexity of
the underlying substantive law," and thus asked the court to apply a
heightened pleading standard to allegations of municipal liability under §
1983.96 The Supreme Court held that the heightened pleading requirement
could not be squared with the liberal notice pleading requirement of Rule 8,
and that an amplification of the standard "must be obtained by the process
of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation." 97
Although some commentators believed that Leatherman essentially ended
the use of a heightened pleading standard in all areas of the law, 9 8 the
decision created a circuit split as to whether the holding banned heightened
89. See infra Part ll.B.2; see also Gay & Hagey, supra note 66, at 9 (noting that
"[c]ourts have also enforced a rigorous heightened pleading standard and closely scrutinized
pleadings that allege vicariously liability for third-party misconduct").
90. Fairman, supra note 75, at 988.
91. Id. at 1002. In The Myth of Notice Pleading, Christopher Fairman also describes a
more extreme version of heightened pleading referred to as "hyperpleading," which requires
that the plaintiff "state facts supporting each of the elements of a claim." Id. at 1008.
Although prior to Twombly this standard was applied in claims brought under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, it has never been applied in ATS cases and thus will not be addressed in
this Note. See id. at 1008 n.143
92. For further discussion of the genesis of heightened pleading in civil rights cases, see
Fairman, supra note 77, at 574-96.
93. Id. at 574.
94. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
95. Id. at 164-65.
96. Id. at 167.
97. Id. at 168. The Court essentially determined that it would be unfair to have a "more
demanding rule for pleading a complaint under [one type of case] than for pleading other
kinds of claims for relief." Id. at 167.
98. See, e.g., Nancy J. Bladich, Comment, The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil
Rights Cases, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 839, 851 (1994); see also Fairman, supra note 77, at 583.
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pleading altogether, permitted heightened pleading in all but municipal
liability cases under § 1983, or only disallowed heightened pleading in
cases involving subjective intent as an element of a constitutional claim. 99
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., l00 the Supreme Court attempted to
resolve the subsequent disarray regarding Rule 8 pleading standards. There
the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether to uphold the Second
Circuit's heightened pleading requirement that an employment
discrimination complaint contain facts supporting each element of a prima
facie case. °10 In Swierkiewicz, Akos Swierkiewicz, a Hungarian native,
brought an employment discrimination suit alleging that his demotion and
subsequent termination from his job as senior vice president and chief
underwriting officer of a reinsurance company was the result of
discrimination based on national origin and age. 10 2 Looking to the prima
facie case requirements set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,10 3
the Second Circuit required Swierkiewicz to "allege in his complaint: (1)
membership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question;
(3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an
inference of discrimination."' 1 4 After review of the complaint, the court
dismissed the claim. 10 5 In reversing the Second Circuit's decision, the
Supreme Court restated its reliance on Conley and held that the heightened
pleading requirement was incompatible with Rule 8(a)'s simplified
pleading standard, which "relies on liberal discovery rules and summary
judgment motions," and not pleadings, "to define disputed facts and issues
and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."' 1 6 The Court further stressed its
earlier statement in Leatherman that a heightened pleading standard can
only be brought about "'by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and
not by judicial interpretation.'""0 7
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of a heightened pleading standard
in Swierkiewicz, some courts limit the holding to employment
discrimination cases and continue to apply a heightened pleading standard
where they deem it necessary to prevent excessive or frivolous litigation. 10 8
Courts continue to subject to the heightened pleading standard allegations
of conspiracy where "the underlying tort [is] fraud" and conspiracies
99. For a more in-depth discussion of the circuit split, see Fairman, supra note 77, at
583-90.
100. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
101. Id. at 508.
102. Id. at 508-09.
103. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
104. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
105. Id. at 515.
106. Id. at 512.
107. Id. at 515 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
108. For a more detailed discussion of post-Swierkiewicz judicially imposed heightened
pleading standards involving antitrust, civil rights, conspiracy, copyright, defamation,
negligence, and RICO claims, see Fairman, supra note 75, at 1011-59.
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alleged "between private actors and government officials."' 109 Whether a
heightened pleading standard applies to the conspiracy element of section 1
violations of the Sherman Act has proved particularly controversial,11 0 a
controversy eventually leading to the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in
Twombly, 111 which seemingly established a new standard-plausibility
pleading.
3. Plausibility Pleading
In Twombly, the Supreme Court reassessed Swierkiewicz and its
commitment to the position that the Rules relied on discovery and summary
judgment-not pleadings-to weed out frivolous claims. In the context of
antitrust conspiracy claims, the Court articulated a new pleading standard-
the "plausibility pleading standard"-requiring that the pleaded facts "raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of those
facts. 112
Twombly was a class action suit brought by William Twombly and
Lawrence Marcus on behalf of a class of local telephone and high-speed
internet subscribers against four ILECs. 113 The plaintiffs alleged that the
ILECs violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with one
another to stifle the competition from competitive local exchange carriers
(CLECs), thereby restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 114 The
scheme, they alleged, involved the ILECs "engaging in parallel conduct in
their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs.' ' 115
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 116
As explained by Professor Allan Ides of Loyola Law School, this language
has been interpreted as to comprise three elements: (1) a concerted action,
(2) that unreasonably restrains trade or competition, and (3) that has an
effect on interstate commerce. 117 Professor Ides further notes that the
concerted action comes in the form of an agreement, and thus it is not
"sufficient to show that a defendant or defendants restrained trade or
engaged in anticompetitive practices. They must have agreed among
109. Id. at 1036.
110. See id. at 1003. Courts continue to apply a heightened pleading standard in cases
that are "aimed at the state of mind of the defendant," by "requir[ing] specific evidence of
unlawful intent to be pleaded when subjective intent is an element of... [the] claim." Id.
111. See infra Part I.B.3.
112. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
113. Id. at 1962 & n.1 (noting that "the four ILECs [incumbent local exchange carriers]
named in this suit [are]: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International, Inc.,
SBC Communications, Inc., and Verizon Communications, Inc.").
114. Id. at 1961-62.
115. Id. at 1962 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2007).
117. Ides, supra note 87, at 619.
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themselves to do so."118 This agreement element is central to section 1
Sherman Act claims, and thus to Twombly, because plaintiffs in section 1
claims must show more than parallel conduct to support an inference of an
agreement to restrain trade. 119 As Professor Ides states,
A plaintiff might show, for example, that the conduct at issue would have
been against each defendant's economic self-interest in the absence of
concerted action or that the collective defendants had a common motive
that altered the choices that would have been made based solely on
motivations of individual self-interest. This additional evidence is
sometimes referred to as a "plus factor," and without it a plaintiff seeking
to establish an agreement in restraint of trade solely by means of parallel
conduct cannot prevail. 120
Thus, the articulation of the plausibility standard formed in response to the
question of whether the plaintiffs complaint in Twombly, where they
"rest[ed] their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any
independent allegation of actual agreement among the [defendants],' 12 1 was
sufficient to survive the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
In facing this question, the district court in Twombly imposed a
heightened pleading standard-although the court claimed it was not
applying a special pleading standard-and held that, to withstand a motion
to dismiss in a section 1 conspiracy claim, the "plaintiffs must always assert
facts that, if true, support the existence of a conspiracy, such as motivation
or conduct that lends itself to an inference of an agreement."' 122 Upon
finding that the plaintiffs complaint alleged "nothing more than parallel
conduct," the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 1
23
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, essentially
finding that in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a section 1
conspiracy claim does not have to be plausible, it merely cannot be
implausible. 124 The Second Circuit further explained that to dismiss a
section 1 conspiracy claim alleging anticompetitive conduct would require a
court to find that no set of facts existed that permitted "a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of
collusion rather than coincidence."' 125 The Second Circuit reasoned that
118. Id. (citing William C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook § 2:2 (2006 ed.)).
119. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993).
120. Ides, supra note 87, at 620.
121. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1970 (2007).
122. Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
123. Id. at 189; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading 10 (Wash. & Lee
Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-17, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1003874
(explaining that the district court "read [the complaint] to allege mere conscious parallelism,
which taken alone did not state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act").
124. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that, "short of
the extremes of 'bare bones' and 'implausibility,' a complaint in an antitrust case need only
contain the 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief that Rule 8(a) requires").
125. Id. at 114.
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such a determination was typically more appropriate at the summary
judgment stage after discovery. 126 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address "the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct."' 12
7
After fifty years of reliance on the interpretation of Rule 8(a) set forth in
Conley,128 the Court determined it was "time for a fresh look at adequacy of
pleading when a claim rests on parallel action." 129 The Court held that the
plaintiffs' assertions of parallel conduct were insufficient to state a claim
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that "nothing contained in the
complaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible
suggestion of conspiracy."' 130  Instead, the Supreme Court found that
plaintiffs "rest[ed] their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and
not on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the
ILECs." 13 1 Thus, the Court agreed with the defendants that "resistance to
the upstarts was [nothing] more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each
ILEC intent on keeping its regional dominance."' 132
By requiring plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy through parallel conduct to
plead additional facts, the Court overturned its previous interpretation of
Rule 8(a) in Conley that a court should not dismiss a complaint for failure
to state a claim unless "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 133 The Court stressed that it
was not attempting to amend the Federal Rules by judicial fiat, and that the
plausibility reading was compatible with the intentions of Rule 8(a)
because, "[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair
notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim
rests." 134 Essentially, the Court modified its position on what constitutes a
sufficient "factual allegation" and stated that, without "some further factual
enhancement" of an allegation of parallel conduct suggesting a conspiracy,
the complaint "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitle[ment] to relief.""' 13 5 The Court explained that it was not requiring
126. Id. (relying on the common requirement at the summary judgment stage that "a
plaintiff must show the existence of additional circumstances, often referred to as 'plus'
factors, which, when viewed in conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to allow a fact-
finder to infer a conspiracy" (citation omitted)).
127. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1963 (2007).
128. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
129. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 n.7. In support of their reassessment of Rule 8(a),
the Court cited numerous cases in order to show that "Conley's 'no set of facts' language
ha[d] been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough." Id. at 1969.
130. Id. at 1971.
131. Id. at 1970.
132. Id. at 1971.
133. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
134. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3.
135. Id. at 1966.
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plaintiffs to meet a heightened pleading standard, 136 but was rather simply
interpreting notice pleading under Rule 8(a) to require "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' 137
Two weeks after issuing its decision in Twombly, the Supreme Court
decided Erickson v. Pardus.138 In Erickson, the plaintiff brought claims
against Colorado prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against cruel and
unusual punishment, as a result of the prison's termination of his hepatitis C
treatments. 139 The district court had dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 140 The Supreme Court determined that the Tenth Circuit failed to
abide by the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a) when it found the
plaintiffs claims "too conclusory to establish for pleading purposes that
petitioner had suffered 'a cognizable independent harm' as a result of his
removal from the hepatitis C treatment program."' 141 Notably, the Supreme
Court cited Twombly's quotation of Conley in its restatement of the liberal
notice pleading standard, and failed to apply, or even mention, Twombly's
plausibility requirement.' 42  The Court's failure to cite Twombly's
plausibility requirement in Erickson, raised questions as to whether the
standard would apply generally to all cases, or was limited to "the narrow
context of Section One claims based on parallel conduct."' 143
II. RATIONALE AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING
THE APPLICABLE PLEADING STANDARD
The lack of guidance on adjudicating accomplice liability claims brought
against corporations under the ATS, and the disagreement over whether the
emphasis on limiting the ATS's reach extends to pleading standards, has
created unpredictability regarding which standard will be applied in a given
case. As some commentators have noted, cases that impose a heightened
pleading standard, such as Sinaltrainal,144 require plaintiffs to "plead
specific details of [their] allegations [which] forces [them] to engage in the
kind of pre-litigation fact-finding generally absent from American
136. In fact, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Swierkiewicz that a heightened pleading
standard is impermissible under the Federal Rules. Id. at 1973-74.
137. Id. at 1974.
138. 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam).
139. Id. at2197-98.
140. Id. at 2198.
141. Id. at 2200 (citation omitted).
142. See id. at 2200; Konrad L. Cailteux & B. Keith Gibson, Federal Court Applies
Brakes to Alien Tort Statute Litigation, Counsel's Advisory (Wash. Legal Found.,
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 10, 2006.
143. Thomas P. Brown & Christine C. Wilson, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: A
Tectonic Shift in Pleading Standards (Or Just a Tremor)?, Legal Backgrounder (Wash.
Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 24, 2007, at 4.
144. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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cases."145 Conversely, when courts analyzed complaints under a notice
pleading standard, such as in Unocal146 and Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,147 courts were "willing to entertain claims based on
allegations of corporate complicity in egregious human rights abuses, and
will[ing] [to] give plaintiffs some leeway in stating the factual basis of their
claims."' 48 The addition of Twombly's plausibility pleading standard
provides a third possible approach to pleading claims in ATS cases, which
will likely compound the confusion.
It is in the interest of predictability, uniformity, and justice to determine
the approach that best addresses the needs of plaintiffs, defendants, and the
judicial system as a whole. 149 Part II.A explores the rationale behind each
standard and its application-or in the case of the plausibility standard, its
possible application-to ATS accomplice liability claims. Part II.B
discusses the procedural considerations, namely the impact of discovery on
the parties and the courts, and the burden on the judicial system. Part II.C
addresses the effect of ATS accomplice liability cases on foreign policy and
corporate reputation.
A. Rationale and Application to ATS Accomplice Liability Cases
1. Notice Pleading
Rule 8(a)'s notice pleading standard is intended to create a liberal
pleading environment that allows litigants their day in court.' 50 In the first
case where plaintiffs successfully pled a claim of accomplice liability, Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., the court applied a notice pleading standard. 151 In Unocal,
Burmese villagers sued Unocal, alleging that it was "liable for international
human rights violations perpetrated by the Burmese military in furtherance
and for the benefit of the pipeline portion of [a] joint venture project."'1 52
Having found it had ATS subject matter jurisdiction based on alleged
violations of the law of nations, 153 the district court turned to Unocal's
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Although Unocal
claimed that "plaintiffs' allegations establish the presence of a business
145. Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating
International Law, 4 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 81, 113 (1999).
146. See infra notes 153-54.
147. No. 96 CIV. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
148. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 145, at 123.
149. See Fairman, supra note 77, at 625 (noting that the unpredictability in applying
varying pleading standards leads to the unsurprising consequences of "[w]hole categories of
cases [being] deemed frivolous [and] [p]laintiffs suffer[ing] prediscovery dismissal, often for
failure to plead facts relating to the defendant's state of mind").
150. See id. at 557.
151. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 895 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., l10 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
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relationship with [the government actors] and nothing more," the court
found that "plaintiffs could conceivably prove facts to support their
allegations . . . [that defendants] have either conspired or acted as joint
participants" in the violation of the law of nations. 154 Litigation and
discovery continued, and the district court granted Unocal's motion for
summary judgment in Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 155 finding that plaintiffs could
not adequately show that the company had participated in or had knowledge
of the human rights abuses. 156 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 157
While a rehearing en banc was pending, the case settled for an undisclosed
sum, believed to be substantial. 158 According to the joint statement from
Unocal and the plaintiffs, "[T]he settlement . ..compensate[d] plaintiffs
and provide[d] funds enabling plaintiffs and their representatives to develop
programs to improve living conditions, health care and education and
protect the rights of people from the pipeline region.' 59 The parties
announced the settlement on March 21, 2005, one day before the Ninth
Circuit was to reconsider the summary judgment motion.
In support of applying a notice pleading standard to ATS accomplice
liability claims, Terrence Collingsworth, executive director of the
International Labor Rights Fund and counsel for plaintiffs in numerous
ATS accomplice liability cases, argues that accomplice liability cases
against corporations are often "the only way for the victims of human rights
abuses by U.S. companies to win legal redress."' 160 In most cases, victims
are unable to seek redress from foreign governments due to procedural
hurdles. 161 Given that the notice pleading rule was designed to allow
litigants their day in court, a heightened pleading standard for ATS
plaintiffs frustrates that purpose, making it likely that they will never get
their day in court. As Harold Koh, dean of Yale Law School and noted
international human rights advocate, stated in opposition to the elimination
154. Id. at 896.
155. 110F. Supp. 2dat 1296.
156. Id. at 1306-07 ("Plaintiffs present no evidence that Unocal 'participated in or
influenced' the military's unlawful conduct; nor do Plaintiffs present evidence that Unocal
'conspired' with the military to commit the challenged conduct.").
157. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 962 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), reh 'g en banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
158. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 15, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126)
[hereinafter WLF Brief] (stating that "[p]ublished accounts suggest that Unocal paid close to
$30 million to settle the case").
159. EarthRights Int'l, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal (March 21, 2005),
http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/finalsettlement-reached-in-doe-v._unocal.html
(providing the text of the joint statement issued by the plaintiffs and Unocal regarding the
final settlement agreement).
160. Julie Kay, Federal Judge: Help Us Apply Alien Tort Claims Act, Palm Beach Daily
Bus. Rev., Oct. 30, 2006, at Al. Terrence Collingsworth further points out that U.S. courts
tend to be the only option because these plaintiffs may be unable "to get a fair legal hearing
in their own countries, and may fear that if they file a suit at home, they will face violent
retaliation." Id.
161. See Olah, supra note 4, at 752-53.
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of corporate liability under the ATS, "[C]orporate counsel have nothing to
fear but fear itself. If you are sued frivolously under ATS, don't panic,
litigate. But if you genuinely care about corporate responsibility, you
should put your efforts into developing these kinds of standards and
encouraging responsible companies to meet them."' 162 On the other hand,
proponents of a heightened pleading standard-or even no liability at all-
fear that there will be an increase in frivolous lawsuits brought by
individuals seeking to publicize poor conditions in a particular country, that
there will be a decrease in foreign investment, and that ultimately
corporations will be held liable "simply for doing business in a difficult
country."'163 While these are valid fears, as of the writing of this Note, no
plaintiff outside of those involved in the Unocal settlement has ever
prevailed in an ATS accomplice liability case. 164 Moreover, "there is little
evidence that the suits are curtailing corporate activity abroad."' 16 5
2. Heightened Pleading
In light of the proliferation of ATS accomplice liability cases brought
against corporations, some courts have opted to apply a heightened pleading
standard to the claims, thereby "subjecting allegations of corporate
derivative liability to heightened scrutiny."'166 Courts applying a heightened
pleading standard explain this greater burden by citing the emphasis on
particularity and the reluctance to find subject matter jurisdiction in the
earlier ATS cases. 16 7 For example, the Southern District of Florida in
Sinaltrainal justified its application of a heightened pleading standard by
citing the language in Sosa that "federal courts should exercise 'great
caution' when considering new causes of action,"' 6 8 the Kadic holding that
a plaintiff must plead more than "a merely colorable violation of the law of
nations," 169 and a 2005 decision by the Eleventh Circuit to uphold a district
court case applying a heightened pleading standard to an ATS vicarious
liability claim. 170  Specifically, the court "require[d] some heightened
162. Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. Int'l Econ. L. 263, 274 (2004).
163. Id. at 263. See infra Parts II.B and II.C for more detailed discussions of possible
negative effects on litigants, foreign policy, and the judicial system when courts apply a
notice pleading standard.
164. Saad Gul, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: An
Assessment of Corporate Liability Under § 1350, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 379, 409 (2007).
165. Id. at418.
166. Gay & Hagey, supra note 66, at 9.
167. See, e.g., Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 19 n.17, Doe v. Drummond Co., No. 06-61527-CIV (S.D. Fla. Jan.
25, 2007).
168. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
169. Id. at 1287.
170. Id. at 1284. The court relied on Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d
1242, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2005), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
chose not to reverse the district court's application of a heightened pleading standard to
vicarious liability claims brought against Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., for its role in
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pleading standard when determining whether the complaints.., sufficiently
[pled] facts showing that Defendants violated the law of nations," and held
that this standard should be applied, "particularly with regard to allegations
concerning conspiracy or joint action that purport to establish that the
Defendants acted under the color of official authority."' 17 1
The Sinaltrainal court combined four cases brought by plaintiffs against
corporate entities and one individual involved in the business of bottling
and distributing Coca-Cola products, alleging that they were "vicariously
liable, through theories of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or joint action,
for the violent actions of paramilitary members-whose actions should be
imputed to the Republic of Colombia in an attempt to intimidate
[Sinaltrainal] union members and squelch [Sinaltrainal] union activity."'1 72
The plaintiffs alleged that the paramilitaries were state actors under the
color of law, and that managers of the four bottling plants had conspired
with the paramilitaries to intimidate and help eliminate the union
members. 173 The court applied the joint action test to the relationship
between the paramilitaries and the defendants, which requires that a
plaintiff show a conspiracy between the private and state actors. 174
Additionally, as noted above, the court chose to impose a heightened
pleading standard, essentially requiring plaintiffs to prove the existence of
the conspiracy in their complaint. 175  The application of a heightened
pleading standard to plaintiffs' claims is especially significant because the
court determined that a failure to show a conspiracy was equivalent to
lacking a colorable claim for a violation of the law of nations, thus stripping
the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 176
The court examined the four complaints in which plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants "affirmatively acted to benefit from the civil war [in
Colombia] by making arrangements to have the paramilitaries target their
human rights violations against a Guatemalan labor union, emphasizing that "' [s]ome
minimal pleading standard does exist"' and that "'[p]leadings must be something more than
an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable."' Id. (citations omitted).
171. Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. The court in Sinaltrainal acknowledged the
Supreme Court's disapproval of heightened pleading standards, but observed that "it appears
that the heightened pleading standard in the context of certain cases ... is still the law of this
Circuit." Id. at 1286. Specifically, the court was referring to the Eleventh Circuit's
"stringent standard" for conspiracy cases, as expressed in Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d
553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984), which states that, in "conspiracy actions, courts have
recognized that more than mere conclusory notice pleading is required." Id at 556.
172. Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
173. Id. at 1278.
174. Id. at 1292.
175. See id. at 1287 ("After careful deliberation, this Court concludes that it is appropriate
to require some heightened pleading standard when determining whether the complaints in
the instant cases sufficiently plead facts showing that Defendants violated the law of
nations."); see also supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
176. Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. The Sinaltrainal court conflated Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), finding that "it appears that the ability of a plaintiff to state a claim
under the ATCA, a jurisdictional statute, has some bearing on the process of determining
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists for 12(b)(1) purposes." Id. at 1285.
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union leaders."' 177 The complaint containing the most expansive description
of a conspiracy, the Gil complaint, was brought by the estate of Isidro
Segundo Gil, a former union member allegedly murdered by paramilitaries
at the Bebidas y Ahmentos de Uraba (Bebidas) bottling plant in Colombia,
and Luis Adolfo Cardona, a Sinaltrainal union leader who allegedly
witnessed the murder and was then kidnapped, beaten, and threatened by
the paramilitaries. 178  In addition to outlining the actions of the
paramilitaries in intimidating the union workers, burning down the union
office, murdering Gil at the Bebidas plant, and subsequently kidnapping
and torturing Cardona, the complaint also alleged that plant manager
Ariosto Milan Mosquera, who was forced to rehire union workers after a
judge found his discharge of them unlawful, "aggressively and [publicly]
threaten[ed] to destroy the union" and "conspired with local paramilitary
leaders to 'drive the Union out of the [Bebidas] bottling plant using threats
of violence, and if required, actual violence." ' 179 As evidence in support of
the conspiracy, the complaint alleged that
* Mosquera "publicly announced that he would use the
paramilitaries in Carepa to destroy the union";1 80
* in the presence of the paramilitaries, Mosquera informed a
member of the local union executive board that he would
"sweep away the union," which was followed by renewed
threats of violence by the paramilitaries; 181
* defendant Richard 1. Kirby, who allegedly controlled
Bebidas, knew about the conspiracy with the
paramilitaries; 82
" Mosquera "openly socialized with the paramilitary forces,"
and "'provided [them] with Coke products for their
parties'";183
" the paramilitaries who were intimidating the employees
"were also given free access to the Coke bottling plant";] 84
* although the union requested as part of a labor agreement
that the Sinaltrainal leadership be protected from "'the
imminent threat of attack by the paramilitaries acting in
177. Id. at 1289. These complaints were the Gil complaint, Garcia complaint, Galvis
complaint, and Leal complaint, Id. at 1278-81.
178. id. at 1278.
179. Id. at 1278-79.
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furtherance of a specific conspiracy with Mosquera,"'
Bebidas and defendant Richard Kirby refused; 85 and
the two paramilitaries who murdered Gil and subsequently
kidnapped and tortured Cardona were "'among the
paramilitaries that had previously appeared at the plant
with Mosquera."' 186
Although the court found that all of these acts combined did provide
"some sense of the alleged scope of the conspiracy," it ultimately held that
the complaint was insufficient because it lacked specific facts as to the
mechanics of the conspiracy and any explicit agreement.187 Without more
detailed evidence regarding the scope of the alleged explicit agreement, the
court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the relationship between
Bebidas and the paramilitaries, or even that their common distaste for the
union, was related to a conspiracy. 188 Furthermore, the court noted that
even if there were a conspiracy, there was no evidence that Mosquera was
acting within the scope of his employment in his relationship with the
paramilitaries, or that Richard Kirby was involved.189
Given that the court acknowledged that the complaint "certainly implies
or suggests that these events are linked by a common plan,"' 190 the
complaint arguably could have survived under a notice, or even plausibility,
pleading standard. Nevertheless, under a heightened pleading standard, the
court found that the "murky allegations of a vague conspiracy between
Mosquera and unspecified paramilitaries to use threats and violence to
'drive away' union leaders and 'destroy the union' [were] not sufficient."' 19 1
The court in Sinaltrainal granted defendant's Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, determining that the plaintiffs failed
to "plead adequate facts to demonstrate the necessary level of relationship
between the Defendants and the paramilitaries," and thus there was no
185. Id. at 1295.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1294.
188. Id. at 1295.
189. Id. at 1295-96. As to the other three complaints, the court found as follows:
(1) Galvis complaint: "Plaintiffs 'information and belief driven conspiracy
allegations [were] devoid of names, dates, or locations regarding a conspiracy
to rid the plant of the union or intimidate Galvis specifically." Id. at 1298.
(2) Garcia complaint: "Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege specific facts as to the
individuals involved in the conspiracy, its terms, or when it was formed," and
therefore the "allegations [were] insufficient to demonstrate more than a
merely colorable violation of the law of nations." Id. at 1300.
(3) Leal complaint: Although the closest to meeting the heightened pleading
standard, the court held that, "on balance, the tenor of the conspiracy
dimension of the complaint, when read as a whole tends to be too 'conclusory,
vague and general."' Id. at 1301 (citation omitted).
190. Id. at 1296. However, the court contradicted itself when, as a sidenote, it stated that,
in an abundance of caution, even under a notice pleading standard the complaints would fail
because they were "rife with legal conclusions, which [the] Court need not accept as well-
pleaded." Id. at 1289.
191. Id. at 1296.
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viable claim of accomplice liability, relieving the court of subject matter
jurisdiction. 192 Therefore, in practice, a heightened pleading standard in
ATS accomplice liability cases places a higher burden on plaintiffs than
both the notice and plausibility standards. At least in Sinaltrainal, the
heightened pleading standard required that plaintiffs plead facts showing
not only that the conspiracy was plausible, but that a conspiracy existed.
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, it
is questionable whether interpreting Rule 8(a) to allow heightened pleading
is permissible in any context. Indeed, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
objection to heightened pleading standards in Twombly, by refusing to
apply a heightened pleading standard to section 1 Sherman Act claims,
requiring a plaintiff to allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to
state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief."' 93 Thus, the
similarity in the elements of the complaint between ATS accomplice
liability and section 1 Sherman Act claims 194 suggests that the Supreme
Court would hold the application of the standard equally improper.
3. Plausibility Pleading
The rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision to apply a plausibility
pleading standard in Twombly is central to the question of the standard's
applicability outside the antitrust context. 195 Some commentators focus on
the Court's "reliance on policies of efficiency and sound judicial
administration as the justification for its new reading of the rule. ' 196 Others
see the plausibility requirement as articulating what is necessary to show an
"agreement" sufficient to put defendants on notice. 197 Courts have also
addressed the question of what the Supreme Court's rationale suggests
192. Id. at 1290, 1293.
193. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973-74 (2007) (citation omitted).
194. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
195. Indeed, the question of the plausibility standard's applicability is far from answered,
and continues to be debated. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 121, 127-28 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (noting that the questions
raised by the Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson will lead to future litigation over
the meaning and application of the plausibility standard); Richard 0. Halloran, A Return to
Fact Pleading? Viable Complaints After Twombly, Ariz. Att'y, Sept. 2007, at 20 (discussing
the applicability of the plausibility pleading standard to Arizona state cases); Patrick A.
Jackson & John D. McLaughlin, Jr., Supreme Court Announces New "Plausibility"
Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal: Not Just Any "Conceivable" Set of Facts Will Do,
Am. Bankr. Inst. J., July-Aug. 2007, at 34 (discussing the potential impact of the plausibility
standard on bankruptcy cases); Comment, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 305 (2007) (analyzing the
Court's rationale in applying the plausibility standard in Twombly, and noting the problems
with allowing a case-by-case application of the plausibility pleading standard).
196. Spencer, supra note 123, at 19; see Comment, supra note 195, at 309 (explaining
that the plausibility pleading standard was the result of a cost-benefit analysis).
197. See Ides, supra note 87, at 626-32 (stating that to require a plausible allegation of a
conspiratorial agreement "would be to say that allegations of a material element of a claim
might be deemed adequate even when no inference of the material element can be drawn
from the asserted allegations"). Id. at 628.
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about the wider applicability of the plausibility standard. For example,
shortly after the Supreme Court's mixed signals in Twombly and Erickson,
the Second Circuit faced the pleading issue in Iqbal v. Hasty.198 After
analyzing Twombly, the Second Circuit found that at the very least
Twombly's plausibility standard ought to apply in cases "where massive
discovery is likely to create unacceptable settlement pressures," and that
Twombly was clearly intended to set a "flexible 'plausibility standard,'
which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in
those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim
plausible."'199 Courts have yet to apply the plausibility pleading standard to
ATS accomplice liability claims. However, the similar practical concerns
and material elements of antitrust and ATS accomplice liability claims
suggest that, regardless of which rationale is more persuasive, the
plausibility standard can be applied to ATS accomplice liability cases.
a. Comparing Antitrust and ATS Accomplice Liability: Practical Concerns
Those focusing on practical concerns look to the Supreme Court's
suggestion that applying a plausibility pleading standard would increase
efficiency, combating costly and time-consuming litigation. 200 In Twombly
the Court found that "it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence." 20 1
Furthermore, the Twombly majority responded to the dissent's assertion that
controlled discovery could solve these concerns:
[D]etermining whether some illegal agreement may have taken place
between unspecified persons at different ILECs (each a multibillion dollar
corporation with legions of management level employees) at some point
over seven years is a sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming
undertaking not easily susceptible to the kind of line drawing and case
management that the dissent envisions. 202
Similarly, the corporations at issue in ATS accomplice liability cases tend
to be "multibillion dollar corporations with legions of management-level
employees." 20 3  Additionally, allegations in ATS cases involve actions
198. 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
199. Id at 157-58. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also recently
grappled with the issue of the plausibility standard's applicability outside of the antitrust
context. Acknowledging that the "the issues raised in Twombly are not easily resolved, and
likely will be a source of controversy for years to come," the Third Circuit declined to apply
the plausibility standard "so narrowly as to limit [it] to the antitrust context." Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, No. 06-2869, 2008 WL 305025, at *6 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2008).
200. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966-67 (2007).
201. Id, at 1967 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 1967 n.6.
203. Id The fact that these corporations are multibillion dollar entities is one of the main
motivators behind bringing these suits. See Olah, supra note 4, at 751-52 (noting that these
enormous corporations "have the deep pockets to compensate alleged injuries; their name
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performed in foreign countries and complicated issues regarding state
actors, making discovery even more time-consuming and costly. In fact, in
its amicus brief in Twombly, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF)
anticipated, and indeed supported, the application of the plausibility
standard to ATS accomplice liability cases. 204  In advocating the
application of a plausibility standard to combat costly and excessive
discovery, the WLF recognized the similar harms faced by defendants in
antitrust and ATS accomplice liability cases. The WLF's main argument
for why a plausibility reading of Rule 8(a) should be required for antitrust
cases, a position with which the Supreme Court agreed, was as follows:
[I]f we require companies to comply with massively expensive discovery
requests in antitrust suits that may allege such conspiracies but that
provide no specific allegations suggesting that a conspiracy actually took
place, [the authors] fear[] that business will be conducted less efficiently
and the antitrust laws will end up discouraging the very competition they
were designed to promote. 20 5
The WLF then cited ATS accomplice liability cases as an example of
claims similar to antitrust cases insofar as the burdens of discovery often
lead to insufficient outcomes. 206 Furthermore, the WLF's fear that the use
of a lower pleading standard in antitrust cases may negatively affect future
business activity is similar to concerns expressed by the Bush
administration and the business community regarding the effect of ATS
accomplice liability cases on future foreign investment. 20 7
Additionally, one of the biggest hurdles faced by defendants in ATS
accomplice liability cases is establishing the connection between the actions
of the corporation and those of the state actor prior to discovery. 20 8
Similarly, direct evidence of a conspiratorial agreement in antitrust cases is
"often impossible to obtain," and thus "an illegal agreement must often be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the public conduct and
'business behavior' of competitors, as well as market facts. ' 20 9 Therefore,
the application of the plausibility standard in both ATS accomplice liability
and antitrust cases benefits defendants by requiring plaintiffs to provide
facts in the complaint that may be difficult to obtain prior to discovery.
brands provide the publicity necessary to attract international attention; and their overseas
operations are generally the locus and the raison d'etre for the alleged wrongs").
204. See generally WLF Brief, supra note 158.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Id. at 13-15 (implying that discovery burdens in ATS accomplice liability cases
induce settlement because "the inability of defendants to prevail on meritorious Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss has forced the settlement of numerous suits despite what often
appear to be factually insufficient allegations in the complaint").
207. See infra Part II.C.2.
208. See infra Part I1.B.I.
209. Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'don
other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)).
2206 [Vol. 76
2008] ALIEN TORT STATUTE ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
Finally, since the decision in Twombly, courts have begun to
acknowledge the similar practical concerns and suggest that the plausibility
standard may apply to ATS accomplice liability complaints. In a footnote
to his concurring opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.,
Judge Edward Korman stated,
In deciding this motion, [the district court] should also consider applying
the pleading standard enunciated in [Twombly]. The standard seems
particularly appropriate to the class actions in this case, which are
intended to coerce a settlement rather than provide the framework for a
trial which we all know will never take place. 210
b. Comparing Antitrust and A TS Accomplice Liability:
Elements of a Claim
The similarity between the elements required to plead an antitrust
conspiracy claim and those required to plead accomplice liability under the
ATS suggests that courts could apply the plausibility standard to ATS
accomplice liability claims. In order to bring a conspiracy claim under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, as the plaintiffs did in Twombly, "'[t]he
crucial question' is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct 'stem[s]
from [an] independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express."' 2 11
A material element of section 1 antitrust claims is the existence of an
agreement, meaning that separate actions taken by defendants toward a
common goal-parallel conduct-are insufficient to satisfy this element.2 12
Thus, in the absence of an agreement showing an anticompetitive
conspiracy, antitrust plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 213 Similarly, a
material element of an ATS accomplice liability claim is that "the defendant
acted with the intent to assist that violation, that is, the defendant
specifically directed his acts to assist in the specific violation." 214 To state
an ATS accomplice liability claim, plaintiffs must show that the parallel
conduct between defendant corporations and state actors was the result of
either an explicit or tacit agreement, rather than a coincidence. 215 This
210. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 333 n.15 (2d Cir. 2007).
211. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Paramount Film, 346 U.S. at 540).
212. Ides, supra note 87, at 627.
213. Id. As Professor Allan Ides notes, a material element of section 1 claims is the
ability to show a conspiratorial agreement and thus "an unadorned allegation of parallel
conduct is the equivalent of no allegation of an agreement whatsoever." Id. Therefore, in
order to state a claim for relief adequately, "a sufficient outline or adumbration of a § I claim
must include allegations supportive of that material element." Id. Ides's reasoning would
suggest that if there is a claim in which an agreement is a material element and the
averments in the complaint rest entirely on parallel conduct, then the complaint fails to state
a claim on which relief can be granted.
214. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
215. See supra Part I.A.2.b (noting that ATS conspiracy claims require an explicit
agreement whereas ATS aiding and abetting claims seemingly require only a tacit agreement
through knowledge, assistance, and endorsement of a state actor's law of nations violation).
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implies that separate actions taken by the defendants and the state actors
toward a common goal-parallel conduct-would be insufficient to satisfy
this element. Accordingly, in the absence of a tacit or explicit agreement,
ATS plaintiffs have not supported their claim of conspiracy or aiding and
abetting.
The plausibility standard articulated in Twombly states that even if some
set of facts might exist in the future to show an agreement, without
additional facts in the complaint making the existence of an agreement
more plausible than not, pleading parallel conduct alone would be
insufficient to support a claim under section 1.216 Therefore, even if some
set of facts might exist in the future to show a tacit or explicit agreement
between a defendant corporation and state actor to commit human rights
abuses, without additional facts in the complaint making the existence of an
agreement more plausible than not, pleading parallel conduct alone would
be insufficient to support an ATS accomplice liability claim. Thus, the
rationale behind the plausibility standard, which is based on the existence of
an agreement as a material element necessary to state a section 1 claim,




The costly and time-consuming nature of litigation is a substantial
concern to all parties in ATS accomplice liability cases. These harms are
not unique to ATS accomplice liability cases. Indeed, "[a] study of nearly
1000 civil cases... found discovery responsible for, on average, half of the
total cost of litigation." 217  The received wisdom is that, because
"[d]efendants attempt to thwart plaintiffs by burying them in documents
[and] plaintiffs abuse interrogatory requests to go on 'fishing expeditions'
and to pressure defendants to settle possibly unmeritorious claims,"
litigation can drag on for an excessively long time.218 These burdens,
Often, plaintiffs in ATS accomplice liability cases rely on parallel action by corporations and
state actors to support the inference of a conspiracy. For example, in support of their
conspiracy allegations, the plaintiffs in Sinaltrainal cited antiunion statements and conduct
by both the Colombian paramilitaries and the defendant corporation. See supra notes 180-86
and accompanying text. The defendants presented an alternate theory similar to parallel
conduct, asserting that the plaintiffs' complaint merely "aggregates a series of conclusory
assertions concerning the alleged acts of paramilitaries in Colombia against certain labor
union members." Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Memorandum of Law at 8, In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (No. 01-03208).
216. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
217. Comment, supra note 195, at 312 n.67 (citing Thomas E. Willging et al., Fed.
Judicial Ctr., Discovery and Disclosure Practice, Problems, and Proposals for Change 15
(1997)).
218. Comment, supra note 195, at 313.
[Vol. 762208
2008] ALIEN TORT STATUTE A CCOMPLICE LIABILITY
however, can be a necessary evil for plaintiffs, especially in conspiracy
cases that tend to involve "facts that plaintiffs cannot access before being
afforded the opportunity for discovery." 219 Thus, defendants, particularly
in ATS accomplice liability cases, seek a higher pleading standard to
prevent cases from reaching discovery, while plaintiffs favor a lower
pleading standard because they rely on discovery to gather facts necessary
to support their claims.
A comparison of Sinaltrainal and Drummond, both cases in which the
plaintiffs alleged that a defendant corporation conspired with Colombian
paramilitaries to intimidate and eradicate a local union, illustrates the
importance of discovery in ATS accomplice liability cases. 220 While the
facts were remarkably similar, the procedural outcomes were drastically
different-Sinaltrainal was dismissed for failure to state a claim under a
heightened pleading standard, while Drummond, which applied a notice
pleading standard, proceeded to trial.
In Sinaltrainal, the court required plaintiffs to show in the complaint the
existence of an explicit agreement between the corporate and individual
defendants and the Colombian paramilitaries to murder and intimidate
members of the Sinaltrainal union. 221  Even though averments in the
complaint were arguably sufficient under a notice pleading standard, they
lacked the requisite factual detail to reach the level of heightened specificity
required by the court.222 In response to the allegations of conspiracy in one
of the four complaints, the court noted that combined the facts did provide
''some sense of the alleged scope of the conspiracy," but nevertheless held
that the complaint was insufficient because it lacked specific facts as to the
mechanics of the conspiracy and as to the existence of any explicit
agreement. 223
Rather than dismissing the complaint, the court in Sinaltrainal could
have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to discovery, as in Drummond, to
establish the facts supporting the existence of the conspiracy. For example,
the Drummond plaintiffs also alleged conspiracy, and even though the court
initially dismissed the claim on summary judgment, the court reconsidered
the issue in light of documents and deposition testimony supporting a
conspiratorial agreement between the defendants and the paramilitaries. 224
Specifically, on reconsideration, plaintiffs presented evidence showing the
219. Spencer, supra note 123, at 32.
220. Compare supra Part I.A.2.c (describing the facts and allegations in Drummond),
with supra notes 177-89 (describing the facts and allegations in Sinaltrainao.
221. See In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1287, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(noting that "some level of specificity is required to link the 'explicit agreement' between
[defendant] and the paramilitaries to the horrible acts that occurred").
222. See id. at 1296; supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
223. Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
224. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Conspiracy, Agency, and State Action
Issues at 1, Romero v. Drummond Co., CV-03-BE-0575-N (N.D. Ala. July 7, 2007) (citing
Pretrial Order, supra note 65, at 4 n.2).
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defendants' and paramilitaries' common goal of eradicating the union,225
that certain individuals witnessed employees of Drummond meeting with
the paramilitary terrorist organization on numerous occasions, 226 that
Drummond employees stated that the paramilitaries were "taking care" of
their problem with the union, 227 and that Colombian military members were
prevented from ambushing the terrorist group on Drummond property
because the paramilitaries were Drummond's "friends. '228 Although the
plaintiffs were unable to try the conspiracy claims-because the court
excluded certain depositions for procedural reasons 229-the evidence
acquired through discovery shows that the type of information the
Sinaltrainal court found lacking in the plaintiffs' initial complaint may be
discoverable. 230 Thus, by applying a heightened pleading standard and
requiring proof of the conspiracy at the pleading stage in Sinaltrainal
despite the existence of plausible claims of conspiracy, plaintiffs were never
given the opportunity to conduct adequate discovery and defendants were
given a free pass for potential human rights violations.
Courts adjudicating antitrust cases face similar tension between a
plaintiffs ability to secure necessary facts prediscovery and the excessive
discovery burdens faced by defendants. Indeed, it was for this very reason
that the Supreme Court held in a 1976 antitrust case that, "'in antitrust cases
where the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators....
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
should be granted very sparingly.' 231  Conversely, the majority in
Twombly no longer found this concern determinative in antitrust cases
alleging conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as evidenced by
225. Id. at 3-4 (discussing evidence that "Drummond shared the [paramilitaries'] goal of
eliminating the Union" and citing examples of antiunion statements made by Drummond
employees).
226. Id. at 2-3 (citing the deposition of Edwin Guzman, a member of the Colombian
military, who stated that "he and four other Colombian soldiers accompanied a high-level
Drummond manager, Mitchell, to meet with a high-ranking [paramilitary] commander,
'Cebolla,' on Drummond property").
227. Id. at 3-4 (citing evidence that "stated that the paramilitaries would 'take care of'
Drummond's problems with the attacks upon the trains," which Drummond officials had
blamed on union members).
228. Id. at 3-4 (citing the deposition testimony of Edwin Guzman and Isnardo Ropera,
two members of the Colombian military, who testified that a Drummond employee actually
stopped them "from ambushing a paramilitary unit on Drummond property, telling them that
he did.not want them to attack his 'friends"').
229. The court still permitted plaintiffs to bring the aiding and abetting claim, which
relied on similar facts and evidence of cooperation between Drummond and the Colombian
paramilitaries. See Pretrial Order, supra note 65, at 5. Additionally, the admissibility of
these depositions is currently on appeal and, if admitted, the Eleventh Circuit could remand
the case for a new trial. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
230. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (noting that
"the allegations never state that the explicit conspiracy entailed this mechanism to bring
about the end of the union").
231. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1983 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)); see supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the Supreme Court opted to apply the more demanding
plausibility standard. One of the Supreme Court's justifications for
Twombly's plausibility pleading standard was to increase efficiency by
combating costly and time-consuming litigation. 232  While there are
numerous similarities between the types of discovery burdens in antitrust
and ATS cases, 233 the foreign location of the offenses, evidence, and
witnesses in ATS cases could tip the balance in favor of applying the less
stringent notice pleading standard. Additionally, the defendant corporations
in ATS cases tend to be organized in very complex "multi-tiered corporate
structures consisting of a dominant parent corporation, subholding
companies, and scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiaries scattered
around the world," 234 making discovery difficult to expedite and
coordinate. Not only is the discovery more complicated, but the plaintiffs
ability to gather facts prediscovery is hindered in ATS cases because most
plaintiffs "liv[e] in fear of abusive governments and fac[e] hostile
corporations unwilling to provide them with facts." 235 This is especially
problematic because "most of the information is in the hands of States or
MNCs [multinational corporations] unwilling to cooperate with
plaintiffs."'236
Furthermore, while the plausibility pleading standard may lower
discovery costs by increasing 12(b)(6) dismissals, 237 it has the potential to
lead to the premature dismissal of socially beneficial cases, or to higher
costs for plaintiffs, who would have to spend more money on fact-finding
before filing a complaint.238 Although these arguments exist in the antitrust
context, 239 these harms are amplified in ATS accomplice liability cases
where some argue the publicity from litigation can instigate change in
232. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67; see also supra notes 200-02. Notably, not all
commentators believe that courts should use a cost-benefit analysis to determine the
applicable pleading standard. As one commentator explains, "[A] judicial opinion is simply
the wrong forum for engaging in a consequentialist revision of procedural rules." Comment,
supra note 195, at 313. Specifically, the application of a more demanding pleading standard
should not be determined on a case-by-case basis where the court can "rely only on the facts
of the case before it and the Justices' own intuitions," but is more appropriately determined
by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules that has an opportunity to review all of the
empirical research on the costs and benefits of applying a higher pleading standard. Id.
233. See supra notes 200-10.
234. Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations
Under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 493,
493 (2002).
235. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 145, at 122.
236. Id.
237. See Dodson, supra note 195, at 126 (highlighting that the plausibility standard
"invites defendants to file motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) with greater frequency
where the complaint does not allege supporting facts, and it suggests that at least some of
those motions should be granted with more regularity").
238. Comment, supra note 195, at 314.
239. See id. (noting that, if Twombly had gone forward and revealed a conspiracy, it
would have combated the "massive social cost of the defendants' anticompetitive
practices").
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corporate activity abroad,240 and plaintiffs already face high costs at the
early stage of litigation by having to defend against numerous procedural
barriers. 241 Furthermore, the same procedural barriers that raise plaintiffs'
costs benefit defendants by providing additional opportunities to dismiss
frivolous cases or cases improperly brought in the United States. 242 In the
antitrust context, some argue that the plausibility standard safeguards
defendants from meritless lawsuits to the detriment of plaintiffs unable to
procure documents to illuminate a conspiracy prior to discovery. 243
Conversely, the fact that many courts in ATS accomplice liability cases
apply a more demanding heightened pleading standard suggests that in
reality applying a plausibility standard to ATS accomplice liability cases
may benefit plaintiffs. Thus, although it is arguable that the plausibility
standard is less central to combating the practical concerns in ATS
accomplice liability cases than in antitrust cases-because it leads to greater
inequity than under a notice pleading standard-it could be more beneficial
to plaintiffs than the status quo.
2. Burden on the Courts
The legal and factual complexities of ATS accomplice liability cases
produce litigation lasting years, even decades, leading "courts [to] endure
countless rounds of motion practice, amended pleadings, court hearings and
appeal[s]," much of which centers on the foreign relations implications of
these cases. 244 Courts respond with the increased use of discretionary
prudential doctrines, and in some instances heightened pleading standards,
to prevent these cases from going forward. 245  As the defendants in
Sinaltrainal argued, applying a notice pleading standard to accomplice
liability allegations linking private actors and state actors would "impose
significant burdens on the U.S. judicial system-straining the resources of
federal courts, imposing jury duty on communities having no relation to
events at issue, and entangling the parties in conflicts of law issues and
foreign legal systems." 246
Proponents of a notice pleading standard point to preexisting legal
barriers such as forum non conveniens, the political question doctrine, the
act of state doctrine, exhaustion of remedies, dormant foreign affairs power,
and international comity, which serve to limit claims that are frivolous or
should be brought in other forums. In fact, courts utilize these barriers as a
240. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
241. See infra Part II.B.2.
242. See infra Part II.B.2.
243. See Dodson, supra note 195, at 124.
244. Gay & Hagey, supra note 66, at 4.
245. Id. at 4, 9.
246. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1290 n.23 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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way to "avoid the ultimate difficulties faced by parties and [the] judicial
system in [ATS accomplice liability] cases." 247
For example, the act of state and political question doctrines are policies
"under which a court will decline to exercise jurisdiction it admittedly has,
because the issues presented are non-justiciable, and both explicitly reflect
the constitutional separation of powers." 248  Principles of international
comity often lead courts to defer to foreign law as part of a general
accommodation shown by one sovereign to another.24 9 Finally, the most
common ground for dismissal in ATS accomplice liability suits is the forum
non conveniens doctrine. 250 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens "a
court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized" if an alternative forum exists.25 1 After determining an adequate
alternative forum exists, the court then balances a number of factors
involving the private interests of the parties and relevant public interests. 252
247. Gay & Hagey, supra note 66, at 9; see Gul, supra note 164, at 409 (stating that these
prudential considerations essentially "bar the ATS litigant's access to his day in federal
court"); see also 14D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward J. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3828 (3d ed. 2007) ("The motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens serves as an important tool for dealing with those plaintiffs seeking the aid of
favorable American laws.. . who bring cases in American courts when their claims have
only nominal or tangential connection to this country.").
248. Ralph G. Steinhardt, International Civil Litigation: Cases and Materials on the Rise
of Intermestic Law 581 (2002). The act of state doctrine "prevents courts from inquiring
into the validity of the public acts of a foreign sovereign committed within its own territory."
4B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1111 (3d ed.
2002); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (noting that
the act of state doctrine limits the judicial branch's ability to "pass[] on the validity of
foreign acts of state [that] may hinder rather than further [the] country's pursuit of goals both
for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere"). The
political question doctrine when applied to international cases "limits the exercise of federal
jurisdiction and forecloses judicial inquiry into the propriety.., of political decisions based
on executive discretion." Steinhardt, supra, at 581 (citing Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 483-84 (D.N.J. 1999)).
249. See Steinhardt, supra note 248, at 226.
250. See Gul, supra note 164, at 409-10 ("Forum non conveniens tends to be particularly
efficacious in ATS cases because under the terms of the statute the plaintiff must be an alien,
and thus uniquely vulnerable to this procedural device.").
251. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); see also Steinhardt, supra note
248, at 109 (explaining that forum non conveniens is a doctrine "under which a court may
decline to exercise judicial jurisdiction, when some significantly more convenient alternative
forum exists").
252. See GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508-09. As outlined by the Supreme Court in GulfOil, the
relevant private interests are
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.
Id. at 508. There are additional relevant public interests:
[A]dministrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to
the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for
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Given that the relevant acts take place abroad, and the witnesses and
documents tend to be abroad, most cases pled under the ATS would be
more appropriately litigated in the foreign country where the tortious action
occurred. Indeed, as one commentator notes, "[O]n many occasions,
federal courts have determined that human rights, mass torts, or products
liability claims arising from injuries in foreign countries, some allegedly
caused by American defendants, would be more properly litigated in the
country in which the injuries were sustained. ' 253 This logic does not
necessarily apply in ATS cases, however, because the alternative forum
considered is typically the location of the tort, and the tortious actions in
ATS accomplice liability cases tend to occur in developing countries with
inadequate judicial systems. As a result courts may be reluctant to dismiss
an ATS accomplice liability case on forum non conveniens grounds.
Koh points to additional procedural hurdles when arguing against the
claim that corporate accomplice liability leads to burdensome litigation. He
summarizes the barriers posed to plaintiffs bringing ATS accomplice
liability cases:
To be actionable, the acts committed by a private corporation:
(a) Must be brought in a proper forum with personal jurisdiction and
venue;
(b) Must not be barred by statute of limitations;
(c) Must state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which means
alleging either a transnational offense that either a state or private
individual could commit...
(d) The claim must be proven, not just pleaded, and the plaintiff has a
significant burden of proving the link between cause and effect.2 54
With all of these obstacles, he contends, there is little risk of burdening
the courts with excessive, inappropriate, or frivolous litigation, which
seemingly renders a heightened pleading standard unnecessary. 255 The
holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country
where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that
must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Id. at 508-09.
253. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 247, at 623.
254. Koh, supra note 162, at 269.
255. Id. Notably, one of the barriers listed by Harold Hongju Koh is that plaintiffs must
ultimately prove, not simply plead, their claims and that they specifically must "show much,
much more than simply that the multinational enterprise has chosen to invest in a
'troublesome country."' Id. In other words, Koh highlights the potential problem of reading
corresponding conduct by a corporation and a state actor as conspiratorial simply because
the corporation has chosen to invest in a country with an oppressive regime. Adopting a
heightened or plausibility pleading standard could ensure that the decision to invest in a
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prudential doctrines, however, are discretionary, whereas those cited by
Koh-with the exception of the proof requirement-are formulaic. Thus, if
the pleading standard ultimately applied does not relieve the burden on the
courts, plaintiffs are likely to face increased use of prudential doctrines to
dismiss their claims.
C. Policy Considerations
1. The Effect on Corporate Reputation
ATS accomplice liability places corporate behavior abroad in the
spotlight regardless of guilt, making the effect on corporate reputation both
an impetus for change and a deterrent for future investment. While
providing plaintiffs with a forum for bringing claims is important, a liberal
standard is not without its drawbacks. One concern in particular is that a
low standard leads to "lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful" litigation
where, regardless of guilt, "corporate defendants suffer prolonged public
relations indignities." 256  The corporations involved in these cases "are
often highly sensitive to public reaction to the inflammatory allegations in
many ATS filings regarding the alleged acts of foreign subsidiaries or joint
venture partners." 257 The two most notable ATS accomplice liability cases
where courts applied a notice pleading standard were Estate of Valmore
Lacarno Rodriquez v. Drummond Co. 258 and Unocal.259 While Drummond
chose to fight the charges all the way through to trial, 260 and prevailed,
Unocal settled.261 Both avenues proved to be incredibly costly, and the fact
that Drummond eventually prevailed does not erase the negative publicity it
received throughout the litigation. Indeed, despite its victory, Drummond
will continue to face high financial and reputational costs as the case
proceeds on appeal.
Some commentators believe that corporate reputation played a
substantial role in the disposition of the Unocal litigation, noting that after
nine years of negative publicity and costly litigation Unocal was unwilling
to risk continuation amid predictions that the Ninth Circuit would send the
case to trial. 262 Notably, Unocal did not accept responsibility for the
developing country does not influence the courts' view of the facts. However, given that
many courts are turning to the prudential doctrines to limit the number of ATS accomplice
liability cases going forward, this concern has little relevance.
256. Gay & Hagey, supra note 66, at 4.
257. Id.
258. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253-54 (N.D. Ala. 2003). This case was later consolidated
with similar actions and proceeded as Romero v. Drummond Co.
259. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Part 1.A.2.c.
261. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Lisa Roner, Unocal Settles Landmark Human Rights Suits, Ethical Corp.,
Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentlD=3312 ("Many tort
experts predicted the California 9th Circuit appeals court ... would send the Unocal case to
trial .... ).
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alleged crimes in the settlement joint press release, which suggests the
settlement may simply have been a way for the corporation to cut its losses
in light of the negative publicity.263  If negative publicity creates an
incentive for a company to settle regardless of guilt, then the fact that a
lower pleading standard might allow more frivolous lawsuits could deter
future foreign investment. 264
Nevertheless, creating an incentive to settle lawsuits is not necessarily a
negative consequence, especially considering that in many of these cases
the damaging publicity is not only warranted, but is the incentive
corporations need to make changes in the way they conduct activities
abroad. Some commentators predict that the prospect of increasingly
expensive settlements could change corporate behavior, leading to fewer
human rights abuses and thus fewer lawsuits in the future. As Terrence
Collingsworth notes, after a few more companies are forced to pay a
substantial amount in settlements, "shareholders will demand that their
companies take human rights seriously and move away from a public
relations strategy to a compliance strategy." 265 Indeed, one commentator
noted in response to the Unocal settlement,
Unocal's willingness to pay substantial sums rather than continue to
litigate, coupled with the recent trend in enforcing accountability for
aiding and abetting liability . . . will hopefully make corporations who
operate in close contact with perpetrators of human rights abuses think
very carefully about their role in these wrongdoings.266
Dismissing ATS accomplice liability cases under a more stringent
pleading standard might shorten a corporation's exposure to negative
publicity, undermining the publicity that creates the incentive for reform.
According to Steven Schnably, a professor of international law at the
University of Miami Law School, these cases "can result in great publicity
and put pressure on the company to correct a situation and make people
more aware of what's going on." 267 This benefit is not theoretical; indeed,
according to Collingsworth, who was counsel for the plaintiffs in
Sinaltrainal, since the inception of the lawsuit against Coca-Cola bottling
263. See Benjamin C. Fishman, Note, Binding Corporations to Human Rights Norms
Through Public Law Settlement, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1433, 1452 (2006) (noting that Unocal's
reaffirmation of their commitment to human rights-as opposed to acceptance of
responsibility-in the settlement press release suggested that the settlement should "induce
feelings of gratitude rather than vindication").
264. See infra notes 275-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of how constructive
engagement and foreign investment benefit developing countries and their citizens.
265. Collingsworth, supra note 4, at 258.
266. Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on
Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 13 Hum. Rts. Brief 14, 16 (2005), available
at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/unocal.pdfrd = ; see also Herz, supra note 44, at
42 (explaining that corporations can correct the situation by "conduct[ing] due diligence and
implement[ing] operational safeguards to decrease the risk that their government partners or
members of the security forces will commit abuses on their behalf, or that the company will
be complicit in such abuses").
267. Kay, supra note 160.
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companies in Colombia for aiding and abetting Colombian paramilitaries in
perpetrating human rights abuses, conditions at the plant have improved.268
While a heightened or plausibility pleading standard may lead to fewer
ATS accomplice liability cases by dismissing them in the initial stages of
litigation, a lower pleading standard that changes the way corporations
operate overseas may lead to fewer ATS accomplice liability cases by
eliminating the violations of human rights altogether. Thus, if the fear of
negative publicity from an ATS accomplice liability case could drastically
change corporate behavior abroad, courts applying a lower pleading
standard would have to accept that some of the lawsuits are frivolous and
unfairly punish innocent corporations. While this may be a cost courts are
willing to accept, it could backfire by deterring future investment, leading
to fewer ATS accomplice liability cases at the expense of those citizens and
countries that rely on foreign investment for development and survival.
Thus, given the gravity of the decisions made by a corporation based on
negative publicity from ATS accomplice liability cases, the effect on
corporate reputation is a significant consideration in determining the
applicable pleading standard.
2. Foreign Policy
Proponents of a heightened pleading standard in ATS accomplice
liability cases see it as a necessary hurdle to prevent interference with U.S.
foreign policy. The defendants in Sinaltrainal argued that without a
heightened pleading standard "[f]oreign businesses with even the slightest
connections to the United States will face higher legal costs, and U.S.
companies will be deterred from doing business in foreign countries,
harming international and domestic markets. ' '269 These defendants are not
alone in their concerns. For as long as the concept of accomplice liability
against corporations has existed, its opponents have claimed that litigation
under the ATS against corporate defendants "threatens US foreign policy,
endangers corporations, will discourage trade and foreign investment in
dozens of developing countries, and will undermine the war against
terrorism." 270
According to the Bush administration 271 and members of the business
community, ATS accomplice liability cases "may discourage U.S. and
foreign corporations from investing in precisely the areas of the world
where economic development may have the most positive impact on
268. Id.
269. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1290-91 & n.23 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
270. Koh, supra note 162, at 264.
271. Although previous administrations have dealt with the issues discussed in this
section, this Note focuses on ATS accomplice liability cases brought between the Sosa
decision and March 2008, all of which were filed during the administration of George W.
Bush.
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economic and political conditions." 272  With respect to foreign policy
concerns, the Bush administration has asserted that "aiding and abetting
liability interferes with the United States' ability to use constructive
engagement in conducting foreign relations," 273 and therefore constructive
engagement should be the exclusive model for monitoring and preventing
human rights abuses by corporations in foreign countries. 274  Thus,
although the foreign policy argument is mainly geared toward eliminating
accomplice liability, it also supports the application of a heightened
pleading standard. This accomplishes the goal of minimizing the number of
cases heard, allowing the government to rely on constructive engagement to
regulate corporate behavior abroad while minimizing economic harms and
promoting democracy.
The administration bases its view of constructive engagement on the
premise that corporate investment leads to greater political and economic
growth in developing nations.275 The theory is that, when oppressive
regimes are exposed to corporate influences, they will be educated in
democratic values; in addition, they will become the focus of international
media scrutiny and investor pressure. 276 Proponents of this view hope that
the combination of these forces will result in political liberalization, the
creation of a middle class, and a more informed populace. 277 Moreover,
individuals who live in countries with abusive regimes rely on that
corporate investment for their own livelihoods, including those plaintiffs
harmed by the corporations. Thus, according to proponents of constructive
engagement, the proliferation of accomplice liability against corporations in
U.S. courts will undermine this foreign policy and the benefits derived by
future investment in the developing world.278
Although, as a prudential matter, foreign policy concerns can prevent
certain cases from proceeding, 279 the Supreme Court in Sosa suggests that
272. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 44-45, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). The National Foreign Trade Council
and other probusiness organizations made a similar argument in an amicus curiae brief
submitted in Khulumani. See Herz, supra note 44, at 20 n.58 and accompanying text.
273. Herz, supra note 44, at 18 (citing Brief for the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae at 4, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-
2141-CV, 05-2336-CV); Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Affirmance at 16-18, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 05-36210 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2006);
Supplemental Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 14, Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-50603, 00-56628)). Herz further notes
that the administration bases its advocacy for the exclusivity of engagement as the way to
promote corporate reform on the premise that "it would limit the ability of the government to
use economic engagement as a tool to promote human rights, and is therefore incompatible
with U.S. foreign policy." Herz, supra note 44, at 2.
274. Herz, supra note 44, at 18.
275. See id. at 28.
276. Id. at 27-31.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 27.
279. For example, courts have the discretion to dismiss cases contested by the executive
for foreign policy purposes under the dormant federal affairs power, which "reserves power
over foreign affairs exclusively to the federal government and precludes states and
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in ATS accomplice liability cases such analysis should be done on a case-
by-case basis. 280 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that "there is a strong
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive
Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy."' 28 1 Notably, the
Court suggested weighing foreign policy concerns in each individual case,
not permitting general foreign policy concerns to create a blanket exception
to hearing ATS accomplice liability cases.2 82 Thus, given that a less
demanding pleading standard does not prevent a court from dismissing an
ATS accomplice liability case on foreign policy grounds, a heightened
pleading standard may not be necessary to achieve the benefits of
constructive engagement.
Furthermore, Richard Herz, senior attorney for EarthRights International,
specifically addresses the administration's claim that ATS accomplice
liability cases interfere with the benefits of constructive engagement. 2 83 In
analyzing the impact of accomplice liability cases on corporate behavior,
Herz found that employing accomplice liability and constructive
engagement in tandem best promotes reform abroad.284 In order for the
engagement model to produce the beneficial results of promoting
democracy and reform in countries with oppressive regimes, corporations
cannot be complicit in the oppression.2 85  Consequently, "[p]otential
municipalities from interfering with the foreign affairs power of the federal government."
Carol E. Head, Note, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Constitutional Implications for
State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign Countries, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 123,
124 (2000) (citing Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 162
(1996)).
280. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (noting that a "possible
limitation" in deciding whether to dismiss cases under the ATS is "a policy of case-specific
deference to the political branches").
281. Id.
282. Id. Courts are more than capable of performing this case-by-case analysis. For
example, in a case "against approximately fifty corporate defendants and hundreds of
'corporate Does,"' alleging that "defendants actively and willingly collaborated with the
government of South Africa in maintaining a repressive, racially based system known as
'apartheid,"' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the question of
whether the case presented a nonjusticiable issue to the district court. Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007). However, the Second Circuit noted that
"not every case 'touching foreign relations' is nonjusticiable and judges should not
reflexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the
context of human rights. We believe a preferable approach is to weigh carefully the relevant
considerations on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 263 (quoting Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH
& Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2005)). Additionally, in Doe I v. Unocal Corp., the
Central District of California stated that whether they held Unocal responsible for complicity
with the Burmese government in violating human rights abuses would "not reflect on,
undermine or limit the policy determinations made by [the legislative and executive]
branches with respect to human rights violations in Burma." 963 F. Supp. 880, 894 n.17
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
283. See Herz, supra note 44.
284. See id. at 4.
285. See id. at 34 (noting that, "by definition, complicity in egregious violations of
fundamental human rights norms supports the very abuses that a constructive engagement
policy seeks to end").
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liability for those companies that aid and abet abuses creates incentives for
companies to do what the engagement model requires and, thus, to actively
promote reform." 286  According to Herz, the fact that ATS accomplice
liability cases "present the risk of large verdicts and serious harm to
corporate reputation" provides the incentive for companies "to alter the way
they interact with repressive regimes or members of foreign militaries that
provide corporate security. '287 Furthermore, Herz notes that "[t]he actual
filing and litigation of a case against a corporation that has abetted abuses"
will provide an example of democracy to oppressive regimes by illustrating
"how an independent judiciary operates in a free society. ' 288 Essentially,
the benefits of constructive engagement in some situations are only
realized, and in others enhanced, by the coexistence of ATS accomplice
liability.
Regarding the concern that ATS accomplice liability deters foreign
investment, Herz argues that, even if it does deter investment, it would only
be by "corporations unwilling or unable to invest without being complicit in
egregious abuses." 289  Significantly, these same corporations would not
further the goals of constructive engagement. Herz further notes that none
of the opponents of ATS accomplice liability have "presented any empirical
evidence suggesting that corporations will decline significant investment
opportunities based on the possibility that they will be [subject to
accomplice liability] . . . . Nor have they provided any evidence that
corporations with substantial investments will pull out of existing
projects." 290 Saad Gul provides one example supporting the idea that ATS
accomplice liability does not deter further investment.291 In Royal Dutch
Petroleum, the court applied the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a) when
assessing the 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss plaintiffs suit
"against two European oil companies . . . which plaintiffs allege directed
and aided the Nigerian government in violating plaintiffs' rights. '292 The
court held that "plaintiffs allege[d] various acts that, if proven, would
demonstrate 'a substantial degree of cooperative action between' corporate
defendants and Nigerian officials in conduct that violated plaintiffs'
286. Id. at 4.
287. Id. at 5. Herz explains that this incentive of potential litigation is necessary because
"corporations involved in abuses may prefer the stability of their existing partnership with
autocratic regimes over the uncertainty of democratization." Id. at 35.
288. Id. at 45-46.
289. Id. at 25. Herz further claims that even if some innocent corporations were deterred,
the administration's argument rests on the idea that "many" corporations would be deterred,
which would not be, nor has it been, the case. Id. at 25-26.
290. Id at 24.
291. See generally Gul, supra note 164.
292. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). Here, "Plaintiffs allege violations of seven international norms:
(1) summary execution... ; (2) crimes against humanity ... ; (3) torture... ; (4) cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment ... ; (5) arbitrary arrest and detention... ; (6) violation of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person.. . ; and (7) violation of the right to peaceful
assembly and association .... Id. at *6.
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rights. '293 Despite the concern that this decision would deter future foreign
investment, Gul noted that "there is little evidence that the suits are
curtailing corporate activity abroad; Shell and Chevron both announced
extensive investment in Nigeria despite ATS suits being filed against them
for activities there. 294
III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD TO ATS
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY CASES
Parts I and II of this Note discussed the direct and indirect implications of
three pleading standards on ATS accomplice liability cases: a liberal notice
standard benefiting plaintiffs by allowing them to wait until discovery to
frilly develop their claims, a heightened pleading standard benefiting
defendants by effectively barring cases from going forward, and a
plausibility standard that benefits both parties by filtering out frivolous
claims while allowing plaintiffs more leeway in stating a claim prior to
discovery. Courts must hold corporations who have violated human rights
accountable, and the system should not be averse to providing legitimate
plaintiffs this relief because of the potential negative repercussions from
frivolous cases. Thus, given the similarity between antitrust and ATS
accomplice liability claims, as well as the ability to balance the plethora of
concerns regarding the impact of ATS accomplice liability on plaintiffs'
rights, the judicial system, foreign policy, and corporate behavior, courts
should uniformly apply Twombly's plausibility pleading standard to ATS
accomplice liability claims.
A. How the Plausibility Standard Affects an
A TS Accomplice Liability Claim
In the context of ATS accomplice liability cases, applying a plausibility
pleading standard will likely lead to fewer dismissals than the heightened
pleading standard, but more than the notice pleading standard.295 The
heightened pleading standard applied to ATS accomplice liability claims
requires plaintiffs to plead facts with a heightened specificity, essentially
requiring plaintiffs to prove the relationship between the corporation and
the state actor at the pleading stage.296 Conversely, the plausibility standard
requires that plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to render the relationship
plausible. 297 Logically, while the plausibility standard will still lead to the
dismissal of some complaints that would otherwise survive under a notice
pleading standard, it will allow nonfrivolous claims otherwise dismissed
under a heightened pleading standard. Reanalyzing the Sinaltrainal
complaint under a plausibility standard illustrates the potential difference in
293. Id. at* 13.
294. Gul, supra note 164, at 418.
295. See supra note 237.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
297. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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outcome when applying a plausibility standard to ATS accomplice liability
cases.
Under the heightened pleading standard, the court dismissed the
Sinaltrainal complaint because the plaintiffs were unable to prove the
existence of a conspiracy between the defendant corporation and the
Colombian paramilitaries. 2 98 Courts would deal with these grounds for
dismissal differently under a plausibility standard, because in Twombly the
Supreme Court stated that, to satisfy the plausibility standard, allegations of
parallel conduct "must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be
independent action." 2 99 The plaintiffs in Twombly relied on the parallel
motives of each ILEC wanting to prevent competition in their respective
service areas and the parallel actions they took to further that goal to imply
a conspiracy.300 Conversely, while the plaintiffs in Sinaltrainal similarly
relied on the parallel motives of the Bebidas plant and the paramilitaries in
intimidating and destroying the union, 30 1 they also showed a questionable
relationship between the corporation and the paramilitaries, as well as
knowledge of the joint intent. 30 2 These facts seemingly raise a suggestion
of a preceding agreement sufficient to satisfy the plausibility requirement.
Further supporting the Sinaltrainal complaint satisfying the plausibility
standard is the Court's statement in Twombly that in order for a complaint
to meet the plausibility standard the pleaded facts must "raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of those facts. 30 3 Given
the information plaintiffs were able to elicit through discovery in
Drummond,30 4 a case with remarkably similar facts and allegations to
Sinaltrainal,30 5 there was certainly a "reasonable expectation" that
discovery would reveal evidence of the alleged conspiracy. Thus, this
example shows how the application of a plausibility pleading standard will
likely lead to fewer 12(b)(6) dismissals of ATS accomplice liability claims.
B. Applying the Plausibility Standard to A TS Accomplice Liability Claims
Is Legally Consistent with the Supreme Court's Rationale in Twombly
ATS accomplice liability cases deal with similar types of claims and
defendants as the Supreme Court envisioned when it established the
plausibility standard, and thus it is legally consistent to apply the
plausibility standard to ATS accomplice liability claims. The similarity
between the elements of pleading a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
298. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
299. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007).
300. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
303. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
304. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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Act and ATS accomplice liability claims, 30 6 the large multitiered corporate
structure of the defendant corporations, 30 7 and the practical concerns about
excessive and costly litigation30 8 suggest that the Supreme Court would,
and should, apply the plausibility reading to ATS accomplice liability cases.
While similar, ATS accomplice liability claims and parties are not
identical to antitrust claims and parties, raising potential reasons why courts
applying the plausibility standard to ATS accomplice liability cases may
not be ideal. In addition to the social costs of dismissing potentially
meritorious ATS accomplice liability cases, 309 the discovery costs are
seemingly more extensive than in antitrust cases because almost all of the
witnesses and documents are overseas. 310 However, the increased cost of
discovery in ATS accomplice liability cases is tempered by the fact that a
defendant can have cases dismissed under discretionary prudential doctrines
such as the act of state and political question doctrines, international
comity, and forum non conveniens. 311 With the exception of forum non
conveniens, these are not typically doctrines of which a defendant can take
advantage in antitrust cases, thus distributing evenly the burdensome
discovery costs in the long run. The impact on plaintiffs in ATS
accomplice liability cases is far more severe than on antitrust plaintiffs
given that in the status quo they face the amplified costs from additional
procedural barriers and in obtaining prediscovery documents from
corporations and state actors. 312  The application of a heightened or
plausibility pleading standard will only add to their prelitigation costs by
increasing their prelitigation fact-finding.3 13
While the cost-benefit analysis in ATS accomplice liability cases appears
to favor applying a more liberal notice pleading standard, the real-world
implications of such a standard also merit consideration. If the rules or the
Supreme Court mandated a notice pleading standard be applied to ATS
accomplice liability claims, courts would simply increase their use of
prudential doctrines to dismiss cases they do not find sufficient. 314
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court's continued rejection of heightened
pleading standards, courts in ATS accomplice liability cases continue to
apply heightened standards, leading to unpredictable and inequitable
outcomes. 315 On incredibly similar facts, the plaintiffs in Drummond had
their day in court, whereas those in Sinaltrainal had their complaint
dismissed. While a plausibility pleading standard does not completely
solve the unpredictability problem, it does allow those courts hesitant to
306. See supra Part 11.A.3.b.
307. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
308. See supra Part 1.B.
309. See supra notes 265-68, 238-40 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 234, 236 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part II.B.2.
312. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
315. See Part II.A.2.
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apply a notice pleading standard a less extreme option than the heightened
pleading standard, and those applying a notice pleading standard a reprieve
from some of the excessive litigation burdens in cases lacking merit.
C. Balancing the Concerns: How Applying the Plausibility Standard Will
Affect Foreign Investment and Corporate Behavior
If, as this Note argues, the plausibility standard will lead to fewer
dismissals than the heightened pleading standard, and more dismissals than
the notice pleading standard, it will also make more progress in allaying the
concerns over the effect of ATS accomplice liability cases on foreign
investment and the need for a change in corporate behavior. The
government and corporate opponents of ATS accomplice liability suggest
that, under a cost-benefit analysis, ATS suits against corporations should
not be permitted-and, if they are, the pleading standard should be set very
high-because, whereas a few plaintiffs might benefit from a lawsuit, the
deterrence of future foreign investment harms the entire population of the
country. 316 This nearsighted view, however, ignores that ATS accomplice
liability cases have the potential to do more than benefit a few plaintiffs.
Indeed, simply bringing an ATS accomplice liability suit against a
corporation has the potential to serve as an impetus for change benefiting
not just the plaintiffs involved in the suit, but also the population of any
country in which the corporation operates. 3 17 Herz rightfully points out that
ATS accomplice liability cases and constructive engagement can work
together to benefit all parties.3 18 Without assurance that plaintiffs will not
bring frivolous suits, it may deter innocent corporations from investing-a
concern Herz finds unpersuasive because he believes the innocent
corporations deterred will be few in number.3 19 That said, although there is
no current evidence of deterrence, 320 given the increasing expense of
litigation and settlements, it may become too costly for any corporation to
risk investment in a developing country with an oppressive regime. Thus,
the risk of deterred foreign investment should be taken into account when
determining the proper pleading standard, because without it everyone
loses.
Applying the plausibility standard will help allay some of the
government's concerns regarding a negative impact on constructive
engagement and decreased foreign investment because corporations will be
less likely to fear prosecution simply for operating in a country with an
oppressive regime. Unlike under a heightened pleading standard,
corporations cannot be as confident that they will be free from liability
under the plausibility standard, thus continuing to allow ATS accomplice
316. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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liability to assist constructive engagement in effecting social change and
encouraging better corporate behavior.
CONCLUSION
Not only are ATS accomplice liability cases needed to hold corporations
accountable for their role in human rights abuses abroad, but they also serve
as a lightning rod for change. 321 Corporate investment in the developing
world benefits both the economic growth of the corporations as well as the
social, political, and economic growth of the population of the country in
which corporations invest. Accountability for the actions they take in
furtherance of that investment encourages changes in corporate behavior
that ensure that the benefits of investment for the population materialize.
The pleading standard applied in ATS accomplice liability cases should
balance the significance of the crime and positive impacts the litigation has
on corporate behavior against the negative effect that ATS accomplice
liability cases can have on litigants, foreign investment, and the judicial
system.322
Applying a notice pleading standard, while preserving the intentions of
Rule 8(a) in providing plaintiffs their day in court323 unduly burdens
defendants, who face substantial reputational and financial costs; 324 courts
that sustain years of litigation and discovery on unsubstantiated claims;325
and citizens of countries with oppressive regimes who rely on foreign
investment that litigation and settlement costs might deter. A heightened
pleading standard, while addressing many of these harms by substantially
decreasing the number of cases that survive a motion to dismiss, raises the
bar too high, leading courts to dismiss cases with merit and undermining the
tools of discovery typically available to plaintiffs to develop the facts that
support their claims. 326 Although the plausibility pleading standard as
articulated in Twombly requires more factual specificity than notice
pleading, it is not as stringent as the heightened pleading standard currently
applied in ATS accomplice liability cases because it requires plausibility,
not proof.
By imposing a standard that continues to expose corporate defendants to
liability while shielding them from some frivolous lawsuits, the plausibility
standard balances plaintiffs' rights and the need to encourage responsible
corporate behavior while protecting courts and defendants from excessive
and costly litigation. Given that the possibility of excessive and costly
litigation in frivolous lawsuits could deter some corporations from future
foreign investment, the plausibility standard prevents ATS accomplice
liability from punishing the many for the crimes of the few.
321. See supra notes 265-68, 283-90 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Parts IIB, II.C.
323. See supra Part ll.A. 1; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 256-57, 234-38, 240-42 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 246, 269 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.
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